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Can African States Conduct Free and Fair
Presidential Elections?
Edwin Odhiambo Abuya*
Asiyekubali kushindwa si msihindani.1
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Can African States hold free and fair elections? To put it another way, is it possible
to conduct presidential elections in Africa that meet internationally recognized standards?
These questions can be answered in the affirmative. However, in order to safeguard
voting rights, specific reforms must be adopted and implemented on the ground. In
keeping with international legal standards on democracy,2 the constitutions of many
African states recognize the right to vote.3 This right is reflected in the fact that these
states hold regular elections. The right to vote is fundamental in any democratic state, but
an entitlement does not guarantee that right simply by providing for elections. The crucial
issue is the extent to which these elections meet national and international legal
standards.
Although most African states recognize voting rights in theory, an examination of
what states do in practice paints a different picture. It shows that the process faces several
challenges as a result of human interference. Accordingly, this paper evaluates some of
the institutional and legal reforms that African states could adopt to prevent voter fraud in
presidential elections, and thereby promote democracy and the rule of law across the
continent. This paper focuses on the recent presidential elections in Kenya in 2007 and
*

Senior Lecturer, Department of Law, Nairobi University (edwinabuya@yahoo.co.uk). This paper was
completed when the author was a Post Doctoral Fellow at the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa.
Thanks to Elizabeth Murage, Dulo Nyaoro, Jørgen Elklit, and Christopher Odhiambo for their useful
suggestions on an earlier draft of this article, as well as to Marsha Mavunkel, Abby Golin, and July
Simpson for excellent research assistance. A note of gratitude goes to Nancy Meza and Sarah Muringa for
their assistance with some of the research materials. A special note of gratitude goes to Véronique Gindrey
for facilitating the three field trips to Zimbabwe. Comments by seminar participants from Bradford
University (May 2009), University of Wits School of Law (August 2009), Trinity College in Dublin (April
2009), and the Réseau des Constitutionnalistes Africains conference in Cape Town (August 2009), where
parts of this article were presented, are also appreciated. Thanks are also due to those who shared their
views with the author. This paper is dedicated to victims of electoral violence in Africa.
1 “He who does not admit defeat is not a sportsman” (Swahili) (translation by author).
2 See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 13, ¶ 1, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U.
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 29, Dec. 6, 2006,
660 U.N.T.S 195; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 23, 25, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 5(c), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S 195. For international legal standards concerning
democracy, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217(A), arts. 8, 21, 22, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
3 See, e.g., TANZ. CONST. art. 5 (1977); UGANDA CONST. art. 59 (1995); ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act
1991) art. 113(e); ZIMB. CONST.art. 61(4) (1979).
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Zimbabwe in 2008 as case studies. In many ways, these events support the argument that
reforms must be made for elections in Africa to comply with international standards. Not
only did these elections have an impact on voting rights, but also they had a substantial
effect on democracy and international and national peace and security. The outcome of
the presidential election in each state was highly contested. Several irregularities were
reported in both countries, casting serious doubts on their electoral systems. This state of
affairs affirms the argument that elections in Africa are hardly democratic.4
Presidential elections in many African countries are very competitive. As in many
parts of the world, presidents in Africa wield substantial power.5 The influence that
comes with the office makes it very attractive. Herein lies the problem, especially if an
incumbent president who is eligible for re-election attempts to utilize all means necessary
to win an additional term. There are no concerns if electoral rules are followed. However,
if the rules are broken, serious consequences result at both a national and a regional level,
as the tragic events that followed the flawed 2007 presidential election in Kenya
demonstrated.6 In the interest of international peace and security as well as in the interest
of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, measures must be taken to guard against
any interference with presidential elections.
The success or failure of an election can be gauged by the extent to which it
contributes to or hinders “political stability.”7 In addition to the domestic impact, the
consequences at the international level are important considerations. Unlike in Kenya, the
results of the presidential election in Zimbabwe did not lead to widespread violence,
death, or destruction of property. However, this does not mean that the country was
tranquil in the wake of the flawed election. In fact, several instances of human rights
violations were reported in the period surrounding the election.8 In order to protect
fundamental human rights, the international community intervened in both countries.
Eventually, this effort bore fruit, as the disputing political parties signed a power-sharing

4 Dan Ottemoeller, Popular Perceptions of Democracy, 31 COMP. POL. STUD. 98, 99 (1998), available at
http://cps.sagepub.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/cgi/reprint/31/1/98. But see Heinz Jockers & Dirk
Kohnert, The Successful Ghana Election of 2008: A Convenient Myth, 48 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 95 (2010).
5 See, e.g., ANGL. CONST. 56, 66 (1992); MALI CONST. art. 29 (1992).
6 Virtually all observers have concluded that the 2007 Kenyan Presidential Election fell short of acceptable
minimum standards for democratic elections. See, e.g., Commonwealth Observer Group, Kenyan General
Election (Dec. 27, 2007), http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/GFSR.asp?NodeID=174448
(last visited June 19, 2010) [hereinafter Commonwealth Observer Group]; European Union Election
Observation Mission (EU EOM), Doubts About the Credibility of the Presidential Results Hamper Kenya’s
Democratic Process, 1 (2007), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/afet21jan08kenyaeomprelconclusio/afet-21jan08kenyaeomprelconclusions.pdf; THE INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION FINAL REPORT, ADVANCING DEMOCRACY
WORLDWIDE: KENYA PRESIDENTIAL, PARLIAMENTARY AND LOCAL ELECTIONS 34 (2007), available at
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Kenya's%202007%20Presidental,%20Parliamentary%20and%20Local
%20Elections.pdf; Kenya Elections Domestic Observation Forum, Preliminary Press Statement and Verdict
of 2007 Kenya’s General Elections (2007), available at http://www.iedafrica.org/documents/KEDOFstatement-31-12-07.pdf; Pan African Parliament Election Observer Mission, Statement to Kenya’s General
Election Held on 27 December 2007 (2007), available at
http://www.pambazuka.org/actionalerts/images/uploads/STATEMENT_OF_THE_PAN_AFRICAN_PARLI
AMENT_ELECTION_OBSERVER_MISSION_TO_KENYA.pdf.
7 J.P.W.B McAuslan & Yash P. Ghai, Constitutional Innovation and Political Stability in Tanzania: A
Preliminary Assessment, 4 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 479, 492 (1966).
8 See infra Part IV.
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agreement in Kenya in February 2008 and in Zimbabwe in September 2008.9 In the case
of Kenya, commissions of inquiry were established to investigate the electoral process ─
the Independent Review Commission (“Kriegler Commission”)10 ─ and the human rights
violations that occurred in the wake of the flawed election ─ Commission of Inquiry into
the Post-Election Violence (“Waki Commission”).11 Both commissions have reported
their findings.12
The entire electoral process in many countries is “vulnerable”13 to fraud. Although
most countries “rarely change” their electoral systems,14 this should not lead to
complacency. Instead, those who seek democracy must fight with full force against
practices that seek to undermine it. Several areas require legal reform, but this article
focuses on three central aspects: management of elections, voting procedures, and
resolution of electoral disputes. These issues are at the core of securing the fair and
honest conduct of an election. They are also essential to any country that is serious about
respecting, promoting, and protecting the fundamental right to vote. Reforms in these
areas could enable states in Africa to strike a “successful balance between democratic
participation on the one hand and governability on the other.”15 However, these reforms
must have a real impact on the ground.16
Section II evaluates the central mandate of an Election Management Board
(“EMB”), namely, to run elections. In both Kenya and Zimbabwe, officials of the EMB
are directly appointed by the president. This section evaluates the qualifications and skills
that these officials should possess as well as the proper size of an EMB. Section III
reviews the procedures used to elect presidents in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Whereas in
theory the process is straightforward, in reality it is fraught with difficulties, including
inordinate delays in declaring poll results. Section IV reviews the issues surrounding
political violence as well as intimidation and harassment of voters. In most democratic
states, losing candidates can challenge the outcome of a presidential poll in domestic
courts or tribunals. However, as Section V demonstrates, an independent judiciary is
9 Agreements

on file with the author.
Authority of the Republic of Kenya, The Commissions of Inquiry Act (Appointment of Commissions of
Inquiry), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 1982, Mar. 14, 2008, at 525, available at
http://www.comms.go.ke/Kriegler_IREC/Annex_1.A.pdf.
11 Authority of the Republic of Kenya, Commissions of Inquiry Act Commission of Inquiry Into the PostElection Violence Following the December 2007 General Election, KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No.
4473, May 23, 2008, at 1249, available at
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Gazette_Notice_CIPEV_May23.pdf.
12 Independent Review Commission, Report on the Independent Review Commission on the General
Elections Held in Kenya on 27 December 2007 (Sep. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Independent Review],
http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/KE/reports/independent-review-commission-onthe-general/view; Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence, Report of the Commission of
Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence Experienced in Kenya After the General Elections Held on 27th
December 2007 (Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/PEV%20Report.pdf
[hereinafter Commission of Inquiry].
13 Daniel Calingaert, Election Rigging and How to Fight It, 17 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 147 (2006).
14 Patrick Dunleavy & Helen Margetts, Understanding Dynamics of Electoral Reform, 16 INT’L POL. SCI.
REV. 9, 10 (1995).
15 Gerardo Munck, Democratic Stability and its Limits: An Analysis of Chile’s 1993 Elections, 36 J.
INTERAMERICAN STUD. WORLD AFF. 1, 2 (1994).
16 For a discussion of deploring electoral reforms that are designed to benefit the elite, see L. Shiu -Hing &
Yu Wing Wat-Yat, The Politics of Electoral Reforms in Hong Kong, 39 COMMW. & COMP. POL. 98 (2001),
available at
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/10406_731207542_713999549.pdf.
10
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required for a contested election to be resolved effectively. To conclude, Section VI
contends that mere passage or amendment of law is not sufficient. Meeting international
standards of democracy requires constant policing of the proposals this article sets out.
II. ELECTION MANAGEMENT BOARDS: EFFECTIVE GATE KEEPERS?
¶7

This section first evaluates the challenges the EMBs in Kenya and Zimbabwe faced
in discharging their mandate. It then explores some of the reforms that could be adopted
to ensure that EMBs function in accordance with the law.
A. Mandate and Independence

¶8

EMBs are public bodies that play an important role in securing, protecting, and
promoting democracy in any state. As the South African Constitutional Court has stated,
they implement “national legislation” on the “conduct of elections.”17 Their main
functions include voter registration, education of voters, conducting the vote, counting
and tallying votes, and declaring the results.
¶9
In most countries, the EMB is a permanent, specialized agency. This is
advantageous for at least two reasons. First, elections are not a one-off affair. A formal
declaration of a winner does not mark the end of a presidential election. Dissatisfied
parties can challenge the results.18 In addition to the winning candidate, an effective
petition should join the EMB in court proceedings. Failure to do this could give rise to a
legal challenge, as the EMB implements any order a court may issue. Thus, the EMB
should be given an opportunity to be heard. Second, the task of managing an election is
quite involved. Significant time and resources are usually dedicated to the success of an
election. In both Kenya and Zimbabwe, the EMB handles key pre-election tasks such as
managing the voter roll and conducting voter education.19 For these reasons, it is not ideal
to have a temporary board.
¶10
The EMB is thus a fundamental institution in the electoral process. The fact that it
is charged with implementing the right to vote, which people often exercise in highly
competitive circumstances, makes it susceptible to interference by, among others,
presidential candidates and political parties. To guard against external influence, the
constitutions of Kenya and Zimbabwe placed considerable emphasis on the independence
of the EMB.20 In both of these countries this independence was strengthened by the fact
that its commissioners had five-year tenures.21 Based on these constitutional guarantees,
one would expect the EMBs and the individual commissioners to be guided exclusively
by the law in the discharge of their mandate.
¶11
However, despite these constitutional protections, the EMBs in both Kenya and
Zimbabwe were vulnerable because those countries’ presidents appointed the members.22
The process of appointing members of the EMB goes to the heart of guaranteeing a free
17

Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC) at 894 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2001/23.pdf.
18 See infra Part III.
19 CONSTITUTION, Art. 41(A) (2008) (Kenya); ZIMB. CONST. art. 61(4)(f) (1979).
20 See CONSTITUTION, Art. 41(10) (2008) (Kenya); ZIMB. CONST. art. 61(5) (1979).
21 CONSTITUTION, Art. 41(4) (2008) (Kenya); ZIMB. CONST. sched. 1 (1979).
22 CONSTITUTION, Art. 41(1) (2008) (Kenya); ZIMB. CONST. art. 61 (1979).
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and fair presidential election. “A unilateral appointment process is more likely to reduce
the appearance of independence.”23 Accordingly, the process should inspire confidence in
the public that the board will discharge its mandate in accordance with the law. A “nonpartisan” EMB contributes significantly toward guaranteeing an “honest” presidential
election.24 An objective institution could also promote the “transparency, accountability
and effectiveness of electoral administration.”25 It therefore becomes a matter of concern
if the sitting president is also a candidate in the election, as was the case in both the
Kenya election of 2007 and the Zimbabwe election of 2008. In cases where the entire
process is deemed to be objective, such as the 2002 elections in Kenya, losers will
concede, as they will have lost a fair battle.26 By contrast, stolen presidential elections
often trigger “widespread outrage.”27 As the fallout from the 2007 Kenya election
demonstrates, the consequences of a flawed presidential election are indeed severe.28
¶12
The appointment of EMB members by the leader of a country is not in itself
problematic. In fact, this process is used in many countries.29 The challenge lies in
ensuring that the EMB delivers an election that meets internationally acceptable
standards. Toward this end, some attempts have been made in Zimbabwe to minimize the
president’s influence over the appointment of the chairperson of the EMB by requiring
him or her to consult the Judicial Service Commission (“JSC”).30 However, this
procedure raises several questions. In particular, the number of candidates that will be
proposed for consideration for this position, and by whom, is unclear.31 There is also no
guidance on the issues that must be discussed at the consultation. A further limitation lies
in the fact that the president is not obligated to adopt the recommendations of the JSC.
The constitution of Zimbabwe provides that, if the appointment of the chairperson is
inconsistent with the recommendation of the JSC, the president will inform the senate “as
soon as practicable.”32 However, the constitution is silent on the measures that the senate

23

MARK FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSION AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 134 (2006).
David Lockmiller, The Advisory Law Commission of Cuba, 17 HISP. AM. J. 2, 4 (1937).
25 Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Expert Team, Sri Lankan Presidential Election 17
November 2005: Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team, 30 (Nov. 22, 2005),
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/AC871F4B-5A17-4A57-AA3931045BD21C61_SRILANKAPRESIDENTIALELECTION17NOVEMBER2005REPORTOFTHECOMMONWEALTHEXPERTTEAM.pdf.
26 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 33 (“An EMB’s success lies in how greatly it
inspires public confidence in its role as an impartial manager and referee of elections.”); see also,
Shumbana Karume, Towards an Understanding of Contemporary Conflict in Zanzibar, 27 ELECTORAL
INST. S. AFR. OCCAS. 1 (2004), available at http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/OP27.pdf.
27 Mark Thompson & Philipp Kuntz, Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October, 15 J. DEMOCRACY
159, 168 (2005).
28 See Edwin Abuya, Consequences of a Flawed Presidential Election, 29 LEGAL STUD. 127 (2009).
29 For instance, in the U.K. and in Australia, members of the EMB are appointed by the Queen and
Governor-General, respectively. See The Electoral Commission, Political Parties, Elections and
Referendums Act 2000 Recommendations for Change (2003), available at
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/63993/PPERA-report--Recommendations-for-change.pdf; Commonwealth Electoral Act, 2005, pt. II, div. 2, § 6 (Austl.), available
at http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/pacific/AU/cwlthelectoral1918_wd02.pdf/view.
30 ZIMB. CONST. art. 61(1)(a) (1979).
31 By contrast, other members are selected from a list of nine nominees, which the Committee on Standing
Rules and Orders [CSRO] submits to the president. Id. at art. 61(1)(b).
32 Id.
24
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may take once the president informs them. Moreover, the fact that the president appoints
members of the JSC33 creates a conflict of interest.34
¶13
For the outcome of a presidential election to be respected, each individual member
of the EMB not only must be neutral, but also must be seen as impartial. Some African
states demanded an impartial body to run elections at the time of their independence.35
Courts in Africa have also demanded impartiality. For instance, the Malawian
Constitutional Court has argued that an EMB must be “proactive and independent.”36
Absent these traits, it would be difficult for the results of the presidential poll to be
widely accepted as free and fair. Both the Kenyan and Zimbabwean EMB fell short of
these key requirements. Several commentators expressed doubts as to the ability of the
EMB in Zimbabwe to be impartial, due to the close relationship between its members and
the president.37 Similar doubts apply to the Kenya situation, where the vice-chairperson
of the EMB in the 2007 elections, Kihara Muttu, previously had acted as incumbent
President Kibaki’s counsel.38
¶14
The independence of the EMB is measured not only in terms of the appointment,
status, and removal of its members,39 but also according to each member’s past record. In
Kenya and Zimbabwe, it is arguable that the past relationship between EMB officials and
the president undermined the board’s ability to be impartial. Some critics may counter
this argument by asserting that, although Muttu had been the president’s attorney, he was
elected to the position of vice-chair by fellow commissioners.40 Additionally, one could
claim that there were twenty other commissioners41 to safeguard the democratic process.
However, these claims overlook the fact that the perceived fairness of elections is based
not only on how the EMB as an institution is perceived, but also on the extent to which
individual commissioners are perceived to be neutral.42 Further, these claims fail to
33

Id. at art. 90.
See ZINBANI MAUENDENI ET AL., CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:
BOTSWANA 18 (2007), available at http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/rr31.pdf (“consolidation of democracy is
not promoted when the overwhelming majority of members of [an EMB] are appointed by the president
alone.”).
35 See K. W. J. POST, THE NIGERIAN FEDERAL ELECTION OF 1959: POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN A
DEVELOPING POLITICAL SYSTEM 165 (1963).
36 Republican Party v. Malawi Electoral Commission and Others (Constitutional Case No. 5), MWHC
(2004), available at http://196.211.206.107/malawilii/mw/cases/MWHC/2004/30.html.
37 Angus Shaw, Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Faces Challenge to His Power, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar.
27, 2008, at A9, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/national/356798_zimbabwe28.html (Zimbabwe’s
EMB is “stacked with former and current military personnel loyal to Mugabe.”); All Over Again: Human
Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections, 20 HUMAN RTS.
WATCH 2(A), 36 -39 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/03/18/all-over-again; Gabriel
Shumba, International Standards and the 2002 Presidential Election in Zimbabwe, 10 ILSA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 95, 104-105 (2003-2004).
38 See, e.g., Kibaki v. Middle East Bank Ltd., (1990) eKLR (H.C.K.) (Kenya); Abdul Karim Hassanaly v.
Westco Kenya Ltd., (2003) eKLR (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
39 ANNE AAKEN, INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES AND INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
OBSERVER MISSIONS—ANY IMPACT ON THE OBSERVED LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY?: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK 13 (Univ. Haifa Separation of Powers: New Doctrinal Perspectives and Empirical Findings
Conference, Working Paper, 2007),
http://law.haifa.ac.il/events/events_files/Aaken%20EMBs%20Haifa%202007.PDF.
40 CONSTITUTION, Art. 41(2) (2008) (Kenya).
41 Id. at Art. 41(1).
42 Data from Lesotho and Zambia affirm this contention. Roger Southall & Roddy Fox, Lesotho’s General
Election of 1998: Rigged or Rigeur?, 37 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 669, 688 (1999); Robert Molteno & Ian Scott,
34
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account for the fact that it is the president who appoints EMB officials, notwithstanding
the fact that other commissioners have a hand in appointing the vice-chairperson. Justice
must not only be done, but also must be seen to be done. Accordingly, if there is any
possibility that the EMB or an individual official is seen to be partial, it will likely cast
doubt on the entire electoral process.
B. Strengthening Election Management Boards
1. Appointment of Officials
¶15

The success of an EMB depends on its “free acceptance as legitimate”43 by citizens
and observers. Fieldwork conducted in the United Kingdom has also found that “boosting
public confidence” in the electoral process could “increase” voter participation as well as
“deter those intent on committing voter fraud.”44 The challenge for Kenya and Zimbabwe
lies in restoring public confidence in the wake of the flawed presidential elections. This is
not an easy task. There are no easy, quick solutions. Even so, practical steps must be
taken to improve the current state of affairs. The objective should be to create an
institution that is “active” and “involved.”45
¶16
Guarding against election fraud, real or perceived, requires a change in the mode of
appointing electoral commissioners. Many election observers have noted this.46 Several
studies have also found a direct correlation between the mode of appointing officials and
their ability to discharge their role independently.47 In the context of elections, the mode
of appointing EMB officials has a bearing on the board’s ability to discharge its function.
As the Kriegler Commission affirmed, staff recruitment has a ‘significant impact on the
quality” of an election and the “credibility” of the EMB.48 Minimizing concerns over
credibility requires a radical shift in the process of appointing members of the EMB. The
power to appoint officials needs to be redistributed if electoral fraud is to be checked.
¶17
Events in Kenya underscore the importance of incorporating challenges to the
appointment process into a formal legal framework. In 1997, the government of Kenya
agreed to involve the opposition parties in the selection of EMB officials.49 Although this
The 1968 General Election and the Political System, in POLITICS IN ZAMBIA 155, 157-58 (William Turdoff
ed., 1974).
43 Richard Soudriette & Andrew Ellis, Electoral Systems Today: A Global Snapshot, in ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY 16, 16 (Larry Jay Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 2006).
44 The Electoral Commission, The Electoral Fraud (Northern Ireland) Act 2002: An Assessment of Its First
Year in Operation 15 (Dec. 2003), available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/electoralcommission1203.pdf.
45 New Nat’l Party of S. Afr. v Gov’t of RSA 1999, (5) BCLR 489 (CC) at 5156 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1999/5.pdf.
46 See, e.g., Commonwealth Observer Group, supra note 6, at 9; Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the
Commonwealth Expert Team on Antigua and Barbuda General Election 23 March 2004 26, (Mar. 28,
2004), available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BF3B45C53F1A0-4557-873D-46EFCBBEE90E%7D_FinalReportOFTheCETAntiguaAndBarbuda.pdf.
47 Edwin Abuya, Refugee Status Determination in Australia: Breaking All the Rules, 25 LIVERPOOL L. REV.
221, 225-229 (2004); Edwin Abuya & George Mukundi, Assessing Asylum Claims in Africa: Meeting or
Missing Standards, 53 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 171, 190-96 (2006).
48 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 84. Research on elections in post-apartheid South
Africa has drawn a similar conclusion. See Jorgen Elkit & Andrew Reynolds, The Impact of Election
Administration on the Legitimacy of Emerging Democracies: A New Comparative Politics Research
Agenda, 40 COMMW. & COMP. POL. 86, 108 (2002).
49 Inter-Party Parliamentary Group Recommends Constitutional Administrative Reforms (Kenya Television
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decision did not lead to any amendment to the national law, the formula was used in 1997
and 2002.50 One might have expected the government to follow this practice in
subsequent elections, but when the Kibaki administration assumed power in 2002, it
refused to do so, despite the fact that Kibaki had firmly supported this selection method
as leader of the opposition in 1997.51
¶18
Although there may be no one correct method for appointing EMB officials, there
are a number of alternatives. Overall, the process should divest power from a single
individual. In his work that reviews elections in nineteenth century France, Frederick
Artz contends that it was “bad practice” for the King to appoint EMB officials.52 Several
works on democracy in Africa53 and elsewhere54 have also underscored the importance of
having a broad-based, as opposed to unilateral, appointing authority. Indeed, the
unilateral appointment of EMB officials is undesirable in any democratic state. Further,
the selection process must be fair and free from any external influence. The underlying
objective should be to create an EMB that is not only independent, but also is seen to be
independent. Courts and commentators share this view. For instance, the High Court of
Kenya has argued that the constitution requires the EMB to be “transparent” and
“accountable.”55 The Kriegler Commission also noted that one of the criteria for
evaluating an EMB is its ability to “assert its independence.”56
¶19
There are a number of routes that could be taken to restore confidence in and
accord effective independence to an EMB. Generally speaking, one of two processes
could be employed─ a political process or a mixed process. Under the first alternative,
EMB members could be appointed jointly by the president and the official leader of
opposition, as is the requirement in Trinidad and Tobago.57 In December 2008, the
Constitution of Kenya was amended to pave the way for such an appointment process.58
This process is ideal for countries with two political parties. However, in countries where
Network broadcast Sept. 11, 1997).
50 See, e.g., Eric Shimoli, 10 New Faces in Chesoni Poll Team, DAILY NATION, Oct. 31, 1997 (on file with
author); Moi Extends Terms of Electoral Commission of Kenya Commissioners, E. AFR. STANDARD, Oct.
25, 2002 (on file with author).
51 IPPG Deal Returns to Haunt Kibaki, STANDARD, Jan. 12, 2007; David Mugonyi & Bernard Namunane,
Opposition Leaders Threaten Mass Action over Poll Team, DAILY NATION, Jan. 13, 2007; Independent
Review Commission, supra note 12, at 31.
52 Frederick Artz, The Electoral System in France During the Bourbon Restoration, 1815-30, 1 J. MOD.
HIST. 205, 209 (1929).
53 David Harris, From “Warlord” to “Democratic” President: How Charles Taylor Won the 1997 Liberian
Elections, 37 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 431, 441 (1999); David Pottie, Electoral Management and Democratic
Governance in Southern Africa, 28 POLITIKON 133 (2001); Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Managing Electoral
Conflicts: Lessons from Ghana, in ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 101, 114 (Timothy
D. Sisk & Andrew Reynolds eds., 1998).
54 Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid
Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 973-84 (2005); Frank Emmert et al., Trouble Counting
Votes?: Comparing Voting Mechanisms in the United States and Selected Other Countries, 41 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 3, 24-6 (2007); Commonwealth Observer Group, St. Kitts and Nevis General Election 29 (Oct. 24,
2004), available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7B5972135AB249-4CA4-B21E-A84996267327%7D_St%20KittsandNevisReport%20_without%20annexes.pdf.
55 Electoral Comm’n of Kenya v. Att’y Gen., (2008) 3 K.L.R. 596, 604 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
56 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 33.
57 CONST. OF THE REP. OF TRINIDAD & TOBAGO ACT § 71(3). Cf. John Nagle, How Not to Count Votes, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1732, 1743-44 (2004) (contending that the evolution of the electoral process in the U.S.
suggests that a similar method was once used there).
58 The Constitution of Kenya Review Act, (2008) Cap. 3A § 2. (Kenya).
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there are more than two parties, this method is inappropriate, as some constituencies
could be excluded from the EMB. For this method to work effectively in multi-party
states, all registered parties must be allowed to participate in the appointment process, as
was the situation in Kenya in 1997 and 2002.
¶20
Some critics have cast doubt on this model. For example, in its review of the 2006
elections in Guyana, the Commonwealth Observer Group argued that it “does not work”59
because it fails to inspire public confidence in the electoral body.60 However, this position
is difficult to maintain because it is not supported by any hard evidence. On the contrary,
as the former chairperson of Kenya’s EMB, Samuel Kivuitu, argued, this process can
give the electoral body “credibility” and “boost confidence” in the “eyes” of the public.61
Indeed, evidence from several countries, including Bhutan,62 Botswana,63 Georgia64 and
Lesotho,65 suggests that an all-inclusive appointment process could minimize doubts over
the impartiality of the EMB as well as contribute to its success.
¶21
As a second alternative, parliament, as the people’s representative, could be
involved in the selection process. In Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia, EMB members are
appointed by the president, with the approval of Parliament.66 It is reasonable to assume
that, if there is any disagreement in parliament on the nomination of any individual, the
matter will be put to a vote, and the decision of the majority will prevail.67 This model
appears equitable on its face. However, it is likely that the party with the majority of seats
in parliament would invariably have its way.68 In order to address this concern, the civil
society could also be involved in the selection process, as is the situation in
Mozambique.69
¶22
The third alternative follows the model that is used in Kenya to nominate members
of parliament70 and was used in ancient Greece and Rome to appoint election officials.71
59

Commonwealth Observer Group, Guyana General and Regional Elections 59 (Aug. 28, 2006), available
at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Shared_ASP_Files/UploadedFiles/0AD0B937-FD40-456B-8495EDB265E8E806_GuyanaCogReport.pdf.
60 Id. at 16.
61 Gakuu Mathenge, Election Chiefs Warn of 2007 Election Crisis, DAILY NATION, July16, 2006, available
at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/133972/-/rv68to/-/index.html.
62 EU Election Observation Mission, Bhutan: Final Report on the National Assembly Elections 11 (Mar.
24, 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/bhutan/final_report_en.pdf.
63 DAVID SEBUDUBUDU & BERTHA Z. OSEI-HWEDIE, DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SADC: BOTSWANA’S
2004 ELECTIONS 11 (2005).
64 See Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, App. No. 9103/04, 45 Eur. H. R. Rep. 173 (S.E. 12), 175 (2007).
65 TUMELO TSIKOANE ET AL., DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: LESOTHO 19 (2007).
66 Electoral Act of 1992, 471 GOV’T GAZETTE REP. NAMIB. 5 (Aug. 31, 1992); UGANDA CONST. 5, art. 60(1)
(1995); The Electoral Commission Act, § 4(3) (1996) (Zambia). A panel, with broad-based membership,
should be engaged to recommend nominees for consideration by Parliament. In South Africa, for instance,
the selection panel consists of the president of the constitutional court, the Public Protector and
representatives of the Human Rights Commission and Commission of Gender Equality. See Electoral
Commission Act 51 of 1996, sec. 6(3) (S. Afr.).
67 See also Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996, sec. 6(2)(c) (S. Afr.) (EMB officials will be appointed
upon recommendation by “a majority of the members of the National Assembly”).
68 The Ugandan government, for instance, passed contentious laws when it had a majority of seats in
parliament. In 2005, it amended the constitution, through the Constitution (Amendment) Act, to eliminate
presidential term limits. Similar trends have been noted elsewhere. See TSIKOANE ET AL., supra note 65, at
31.
69 Electoral Law, No. 20/2002, art. 5(1)(a) (2002) (Mozam.).
70 CONSTITUTION, art. 33 (2008) (Kenya).
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Under this model, the EMB members would be appointed from a list of names that
political parties have submitted. Parliament, not the president, would approve the
appointees. Political parties would nominate members based on the number of seats they
have in parliament. Although this method tilts the balance in favor of the party with the
majority,72 it may be most practical, particularly in power-sharing arrangements, which
often make it difficult to separate the government from the opposition. Further, this mode
of appointing officials is a “powerful safeguard” of the right to vote.73 As all political
parties are involved in establishing the rules of the game, there is a high likelihood that
the contestants will abide by them.
¶23
Members of the EMB could also be appointed through a mixed process. A
competitive procedure to recruit staff could be used. Under this method, parliament
would engage an independent recruitment agency, selected through a competitive bidding
process, to source suitable candidates to serve on the board. Parliament could then affirm
the list of nominees. This process has been utilized in Namibia since 2000.74 Kenya, too,
has embraced this approach since the end of 2008.75 As several commentators contend,
this mode of appointment could enhance public confidence in the EMB.76 It could work
in both power-sharing and non-power-sharing environments. Regardless, for the EMB to
receive broad-based support, the entire appointment framework must be transparent.
2. Qualifications for Officials
¶24

Measures that seek to strengthen democracy in Africa must also consider the
knowledge, experience and skills of EMB members.77 Habel Nyamu, a former Electoral
Commissioner in Kenya, contends that the ‘starting point” for creating an objective EMB
lies in selecting officials who possess “high qualifications and character” and are “beyond
reproach in relation to their past public life.”78 These criteria, as the Kriegler Commission
noted, could promote “integrity” on the part of EMB officials as well as “a sense of
judgment and mettle to referee a political contest without being unduly influenced by
political pressure.”79
¶25
A number of steps have been taken both in Kenya and Zimbabwe to prescribe
minimum criteria for officials. Under both regimes, EMB officials must be citizens.80 In
addition, the chairperson is required to be a judge or an eligible judge—a person who has

71

See E.S. STAVELY, GREEK AND ROMAN ELECTIONS AND VOTING 38-9 (1972); LILY TAYLOR, PARTY
POLITICS IN THE AGE OF CEASER 60 (1949).
72 ELECTORAL INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, MALAWI: PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
10 (2004), available at http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/m04eomr.pdf.
73 Brett Fairbairn, Authority vs. Democracy: Prussian Officials in the German Elections of 1898 and 1903,
33 HISTORICAL J. 811, 816 (1990).
74 DEBIE LEBEAU & EDITH DIMA, MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA 8-9 (2005).
75 CONSTITUTION, art. 41, § (3) (2008) (Kenya).
76 Id.
77 Research on the evolution of elections in the United States supports this position. See John Reynolds, A
Symbiotic Relationship: Vote Fraud and Electoral Reform in the Gilded Age, 17 SOC. SCI. HIST. 227, 243247 (1993).
78 Habel Nyamu, Managing Elections in Kenya, in THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN KENYA: FROM KANU
TO NARC 265, 272 (Walter Oyugi et al. eds., 2003).
79 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 30.
80 CONSTITUTION, art. 41 (1A) (2008) (Kenya); ZIMB. CONST. art. 82(1) (2000).
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been in legal practice for at least seven years.81 This requirement applies in a number of
African and non-African states.82 However, it could be eliminated without compromising
standards. Although elections involve legal issues, that does not justify the requirement
for the head of the EMB to hold a legal qualification. In the United Kingdom, for
example, despite the absence of such a requirement, the EMB has conducted elections
that meet international standards.
¶26
Additional requirements exist in Zimbabwe. Individuals with criminal records,83
individuals who have been adjudged bankrupt,84 and individuals who have a financial
interest in the operations of the EMB85 are excluded from assuming office. It is
imperative for any electoral regime to include similar provisions. The 2008 amendment
to the Kenyan constitution also sought to exclude certain categories of persons from
holding office: persons who are not of high moral character and integrity,86 members of
the armed forces,87 and individuals affiliated to political parties.88 Academic
qualifications were also introduced. EMB officials are now required to hold a degree
from a “recognized” university.89 Doubtless, these stipulations are designed to safeguard
the independence90 and honor of the EMB. In the absence of these requirements, as is the
situation in a number of African states, there is a risk that the EMB will be staffed by
persons “lacking any professional experience or expertise in election management or
other skills that could contribute to the evenhanded management of an electoral
process.”91 It is thus imperative for the electoral regime in Zimbabwe to embrace similar
provisions. However, the list of preconditions in both countries is limited as it excludes a
number of core skills, qualifications, competencies, and values, which members of any
EMB must hold. An ideal candidate should possess:






81

Solid knowledge of the national languages;
Superior verbal and written communication skills;
Strong analytical, problem solving, thinking and writing abilities;
Advanced computer skills;
Excellent knowledge of national and international election
standards;
Consistent high levels of attention to detail;

Id.
See Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, § 6(4) (Austl.); TANZ. CONST. art. 74(1) (1977).
83 ZIMB. CONST. First Schedule, §§ 2(1)(c)-(d) (2000).
84 Id. § 2(1)(c).
85 Id. § 2(1)(b).
86 CONSTITUTION, art. 41(4)(c) (2008) (Kenya). See also UGANDA CONST. art. 60(2) (1995) (requiring
members of the EMB to be persons of “high moral character” and “proven integrity”); Electoral Law,
(2002) No. 20/2002, art. 4(2) (Mozam.) (requiring EMB officials to be “professionally qualified and with
acceptable moral values”).
87 CONSTITUTION, art. 41(3) (2008) (Kenya).
88 Id. art. 41(1)(6)(a)-(c). This is a requirement in many countries. See UGANDA CONST. art. 60(5)(c)
(1995); Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996, sec. 6(2)(b) (S. Afr.).
89 CONSTITUTION, art. 41(4)(b) (2008) (Kenya).
90 Several critics have made this point. See Wole Olaleye, Administration of Elections─A Persistent
Struggle of Institutionalisation and Consolidation, in DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL TRANSITION 36, 41
(Shumbana Karume ed., 2004); Heather Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating
Electoral Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6 ELECTION L. J. 184, 194 (2007).
91 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 31.
82
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High standards of professional and personal integrity;
Proven organizational and time management skills with a deadline
focus;
Confidence to work with a wide range of knowledgeable and
demanding persons; and
Ability to work independently and as a member of a team.
3. Size of the EMB

¶27

The size of the EMB is the third issue of concern. As the saying goes, two heads
are better than one.92 As Table I (below) shows, there is a great variance in the size of
EMBs among countries. The data in Table I, which is representative of global trends,
shows that the average number of EMB members is approximately eight. The size of the
EMB that ran the 2008 presidential election in Zimbabwe was consistent with this figure.
By contrast, its Kenyan counterpart that managed the 2007 presidential election, which
had twenty-two members, was one of the largest in the world.
Table I
Country
Australia93
Belize94
Bostwana95
Brazil96
Burundi97
Cambodia98
Chile99
Colombia100
Cote d’Ivoire101
Egypt102
Ecuador103
Ghana104

EMB Members
3
5
7
7
5
9
5
9
15
10
7
7

92 For the advantages of having more than one member in the EMB, see S.S. Dhanoa v. Union of India &
Others, (1991) 9 A.I.R. 1745, 1754-55.
93 Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, § 6(2) (Austl.).
94 BELIZE CONST. art. 88(1) (1981).
95 BOTS. CONST. art. 65A(1) (1966).
96 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 119 (2010) (Braz.).
97 POST-TRANS. INTERIM CONST. REP. BURUNDI art. 90 (1992).
98 See Cambodian National Election Committee, http://www.necelect.org.kh/English/Home.htm (last
visited May 5, 2010).
99 CHILE CONST. art. 95 (2005).
100 COLOM. CONST. art. 264 (1991).
101 Loi Portant Creation de la Commission Electoral Independante, art. 5 (Cote d’Ivoire),
http://cndj.ci/CEI.htm (last visited June 21, 2010).
102 EGYPT CONST art. 76 (2007).
103 ECUADOR CONST. art. 209 (2008).
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Guyana105
Israel106
Kazakhstan107
Kenya108
South Korea109
Malta110
Liberia111
Moldova112
Nigeria113
Netherlands114
Pakistan115
Peru116
Philippines117
Rwanda118
Russia119
Sri Lanka120
South Africa121
Sudan122
Trinidad and Tobago123
Uganda124
United Kingdom125
United States126
104

[2010
7
9
7
22
9
9
5
9
13
7
5
5
7
7
15
5
5
9
5
7
9
6

Ghana Const. (Promulgation) Law, art. 43(1) (1992).
GUYANA CONST. art. 161 (1995).
106 Knesset Elections Law (Consolidated Version), 5729-1969, 23 LSI 113-14 (1968-69) (Isr.).
107 OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
OSCE/ODIHR ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION REPORT 6 (2004), available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/12/3990_en.pdf.
108 CONSTITUTION, art. 41(1) (2008) (Kenya).
109 S. KOREA CONST., art. 114(2).
110 General Elections Act, art. 7(2) (1991) (Malta).
111 New Election Law, art. 2(1) (1986) (Liber.).
112 Moldova Electoral Code, No. 1381-XIII, art. 16(2) (1997).
113 CONSTITUTION, Schedule 3, Art. 14(1) (1991) (Nig.).
114 Elections Act, ch. A, § A(2)(3) (1989) (Neth.).
115 PAK. CONST. art. 218(2)(a)-(b) (1962).
116 PERU CONST. art. 179 (1993).
117 CONST. (1986), Art. IX(A)(1)(1), (Phil.).
118 Law Relating to the Organization and Functioning of the Electoral Commission, No. 31/2005, art. 7
(2005) (Rwanda).
119 On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to
Participate in a Referendum 1997, No. 67-FZ, art. 22(2).
120 SRI LANKA CONST. art. 103 (1) (1978).
121 Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996, sec. 6(1) (S. Afr.).
122 SUDAN INTERIM NAT’L CONST. art. 141, § (1) (2005).
123 TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. § 71(2) (1976).
124 UGANDA CONST. art. 60(1) (1995).
125 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, § 1(3) (Eng.).
126 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (2000).
105
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Uruguay 127
Zambia128
Zimbabwe129
¶28

9
5
6

Some may claim that the Kenyan EMB required twenty-two members to manage
some fourteen million registered voters effectively.130 However, this assertion fails when
one considers recent elections in Africa and elsewhere. For instance, in the 2007 elections
in Australia and Nigeria, there were some fourteen131 and thirty-five132 million voters,
respectively. The Australian example in particular shows that the solution does not lie in
having a large EMB, but rather in ensuring that it is independent, efficient, fair, and
accurate. In keeping with global trends, the Kenya constitution was amended at the end of
2008 to bring the number of EMB members in line with the international average.133
Thus, the new interim EMB consists of nine members.134 One would hope that the
resources that will be saved through this initiative135 will be re-directed toward measures
that seek to promote democracy, such as voter education and training and investment in
technology that will enhance the tallying and reporting of votes, as evaluated in Section
III.
III. THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: GOOD FROM AFAR, FAR FROM GOOD

¶29

The second area of needed reform relates to voting procedures. Individuals wishing
to vie for the presidency in any country must meet certain criteria. Under the laws of
Kenya and Zimbabwe, a person must be a citizen.136 In addition, he or she must meet
prescribed age requirements.137 Moreover, each candidate must be a registered voter.138
Certain requirements also exist with regard to winning the presidency. As in many
countries, the winner-take-all or first past the post rule applies. Under this electoral
system, the winning candidate is the one who obtains the most votes.139 There is an
additional hurdle for an aspiring candidate in Kenya in particular: he or she must also
obtain a set quota (twenty-five percent) of the votes in five of the eight provinces.140 This
rule is based on the argument that a person who is elected president must also receive
127

URU. CONST. art. 324 (2004).
The Electoral Commission Act, (1996) § 4(2) (Zambia).
129 Electoral Act 2008 § 6(2) (Zimb.).
130 Electoral Commission of Kenya, Registered Voters by Constituency (2007), available at
http://static.scribd.com/docs/2g1csb0l8zj4l.swf?INITIAL_VIEW=width.
131 Australian Election Commission, General Information: Enrollment by State,
http://results.aec.gov.au/13745/Website/GeneralEnrolmentByState-13745.htm (last visited May 5, 2010).
132 Independent National Election Commission, Elections 2007: Results for Presidency Presidential
Elections, http://www.inecnigeria.org/election/show_index_result.php?ele_id=2804 (last visited May 5,
2010).
133 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 49.
134 CONSTITUTION, Art. 41(1) (2008) (Kenya).
135 See Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 43 (estimating that it costs the Kenyan tax
payer KShs 500 million [circa UK ₤ 4.5 million] to pay salaries for EMB officials for five years).
136 ZIMB. CONST. art.28(1)(a) (2008); CONSTITUTION, art. 5(2)(a) (2008) (Kenya).
137 ZIMB. CONST. art. 28(1)(b) (2008); CONSTITUTION, art. 5(2)(b) (2008) (Kenya).
138 CONSTITUTION art. 5(2)(c) (2008) (Kenya).
139 Electoral Act § 110(3) (2008) (Zimb.); CONSTITUTION, Art. 5(3)(f) (2008) (Kenya).
140 CONSTITUTION, Art. 5(3)(f) (2008) (Kenya).
128
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broad-based support. Herein lies a fundamental difference between the processes in the
two countries.
¶30
Although the procedure for electing a president appears straightforward and
transparent in theory,141 actual practice paints a different picture. Several problems
occurred in both Zimbabwe and Kenya, including inordinate delays in communicating the
outcome.
A. Legal Framework
¶31

Multiple procedures dictate the voting process in Kenya and Zimbabwe. For the
purpose of national elections, both countries are divided into constituencies.142 Within
each constituency, there are several polling stations.143 Ballot papers are issued blank, and
voters are required to check a box for their preferred candidate. Eligible voters are
required to cast ballots at the polling station on an appointed day. Illiterate and blind
voters normally receive assistance.144 To ensure that only qualified voters participate in
the process, identity checks are conducted to verify a voter’s eligibility.145 There are no
provisions in both countries for early voting146 or voting by proxy. Unlike the situation in
Kenya, eligible voters can cast their votes by post in Zimbabwe.147 As the case in the preindependent period,148 voting is by secret ballot in both states. Voter turnout in the
Kenyan presidential election was decent. It is estimated that, of the fourteen million
registered voters, some ten million (seventy-one percent) participated in the 2007
presidential election.149 In Zimbabwe, the turnout was much lower. Of the six million
registered voters, 2.5 million (forty-three percent) voted in the first round of the
presidential election.150
¶32
At the close of each polling station, the sealed ballot boxes are opened and emptied,
and the votes are counted.151 Once all the votes have been counted, the presiding official
of the EMB announces the outcome to those at the polling station.152 In addition, the
results must be affixed outside the polling station.153 Results from all polling stations are
then sent to one central place in the constituency for tallying.154 Agents of political parties
141 See also W.J.M. MACKENZIE, FREE ELECTIONS: AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK 141 (1958) (describing the
tallying of votes as the “easiest part of the elections to keep honest”).
142 CONSTITUTION, Art. 42 (2008) (Kenya); ZIMB. CONST. art. 61(4)(h1) (2008).
143 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations of Kenya, (2007) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg. § 6; Electoral
Act § 51 (2008) (Zimb.).
144 See, e.g., Electoral Act §§ 59-60 (2008) (Zimb.).
145 See Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations of Kenya, (2007) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg. § 33.
146 See G.F. Engholm, African Elections in Kenya, March 1957, in FIVE ELECTIONS IN AFRICA; A GROUP OF
ELECTORAL STUDIES, 391, 447 (W. J. M. Mackenzie & Kenneth Robinson eds., 1960) (noting this mode of
voting was available in pre-colonial Kenya).
147 See Electoral Act §§ 71-81 (2008) (Zimb.).
148 See GEORGE BENNETT & CARL ROSBERG, THE KENYATTA ELECTION: KENYA 1960-1961 72-79 (1961).
149 Office of the Government Spokesperson, Election Results 2007,
http://www.communication.go.ke/elections/default.asp (last visited May 5, 2010).
150 See Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe: 2008 Presidential Election Results - First Round,
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zim2008results5.htm (last visited May 5, 2010).
151 Electoral Act §§ 62-63 (2008) (Zimb.).
152 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations of Kenya, (2007) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg. § 40; Electoral
Act § 64(1)(e) (2008) (Zimb.).
153 Electoral Act § 64(1)(e) (2008) (Zimb.).
154 Id. at § 64(2); Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations of Kenya, (2007) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg.
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are allowed to monitor the process at the counting places on behalf of their candidates.155
The assumption is that if there are any anomalies in the counting process, those agents
will point them out. Depending on the size of the constituency, vote tallying can take
anywhere from a few hours to a full day. Once all the votes have been counted, the
Returning (Kenya) or Presiding (Zimbabwe) Officer announces the results to those at the
tallying hall.156 However, unlike at the polling station, these results are not posted. The
declaration of the results at the national level is also made in public. The formal
announcement is made at the EMB office in Nairobi, Kenya157 or in Harare, Zimbabwe.
¶33
The top two candidates in the 2007 Kenyan presidential election, Kibaki and
Odinga (see Table II), met all the legal requirements for election as president. By
contrast, none of the presidential candidates in Zimbabwe garnered over fifty percent of
the votes, as required for victory. As Table III shows, Morgan Tsvangirai, the Movement
for Democratic Change (“MDC”) candidate, obtained the highest number of votes cast,
but this was insufficient for him to win the presidency. He received about forty-eight
percent of the votes, narrowly missing the mark. His closest rival, Robert Mugabe, of the
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (“ZANU-PF”), obtained just over
forty percent of the total votes cast. Since no candidate met the fifty percent requirement,
a run-off election was conducted between Mugabe and Tsvangirai.158 As Table IV shows,
Mugabe “won” the run-off by an overwhelming majority. This issue is discussed further
in Section III.
Table II 159
Results of the 2007 Presidential Election in Kenya
Candidate

Party

Number of Votes

Mwai Kibaki

Party of National Unity

4,578,034

Raila Odinga

Orange Democratic Movement

4,352,860

Kalonzo Musyoka

Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya

Ngacha Karani

Kenya Patriotic Trust Party

Pius Muiru

Kenya People’s Party

9,665

Nazlin Omar

Workers Congress Party

8,624

Kenneth Matiba

Saba Saba Asili

8,049

David Waweru

Chama Cha Uma Party

5,976

Nixon Kukubo

Republican Party of Kenya

5,926

879,899
21,168

§ 35A(5)(d).
155 Electoral Act §§ 55(2)(b), 62(2)(b) (2008) (Zimb.); Presidential and Parliamentary Elections
Regulations of Kenya, (2007) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg. §§ 23(1)(a), 35(4)(c).
156 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations of Kenya, (2007) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg. § 40; Electoral
Act § 64(1)(e) (2008) (Zimb.).
157 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations of Kenya, (2007) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg. § 41.
158 Electoral Act § 110(4) (2008) (Zimb.); CONSTITUTION, Art. 5(4)(d) (2008) (Kenya).
159 See Office of the Government Spokesperson, Election Results 2007,
http://www.communication.go.ke/elections/default.asp (last visited May 5, 2010).
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Total

9,870,201

Table III160
Results of the 2008 Presidential Election in Zimbabwe (First Round)
Candidate

Party

Number of Votes

Percentage

Morgan Tsvangirai

Movement for Democratic
Change

1,195,562

47.87

Robert Mugabe

Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic
Front

1,079,730

43.24

Simba Makoni

Independent

207,470

8.31

Langton Towungana

Independent

14,503

0.6

Total

2, 497, 265

Table IV161
Results of the 2008 Presidential Election in Zimbabwe (Run-Off)
Candidate

Party

Robert Mugabe

Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic
Front

Morgan Tsvangirai

Movement for Democratic
Change

Number of Votes

Percentage

2,150,269

90.2

233,000

9.8

Total

2,383,269

B. Actual Practice: Inordinate Delays in Declaring Poll Results
¶34

It is unrealistic to prescribe a specific timeline within which the constituency
results must be transmitted because the number of voters is not distributed evenly. In
practice, unforeseen challenges normally arise within constituencies or polling centers on
the day of voting, which can make it difficult to meet a prescribed deadline. The laws in
Kenya and Zimbabwe appear to recognize this state of affairs, as they are silent on issues
surrounding the time within which results must be turned in. However, the absence of
160 Zimbabwe Election Support Network, Statement on the Announcement of Presidential Results and a
Presidential Run-Off, http://www.zesn.org.zw/pub_view.cfm?pid=184 (last visited May 5, 2010).
161 Mugabe Wins by 9 to 1 Margin, CNN, June 29, 2008,
http://cnnwire.blogs.cnn.com/2008/06/29/mugabe-wins-by-9-to-1-margin/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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legal provisions should not be interpreted to mean that the EMB has a blank check or that
the EMB can take several days to announce the election results. On the contrary, the
outcome of a presidential poll should be communicated within a reasonable time.
Admittedly, what is reasonable in each case will be determined by particular
circumstances on the ground. Even so, the underlying goal should be to ensure that
results at all levels are transmitted promptly. In addition, an objective electoral system
should ensure that every person who is entitled to vote is able to do so, and that every
vote is fairly and accurately counted.
¶35
In reality, the electoral process in Kenya and Zimbabwe was fraught with delays,
despite the requirement that results be announced expeditiously. This was unfortunate, as
there are several undesirable implications for failing to release results promptly.
Unexplained delays can lead to anxiety in a country, especially if the constituencies in
question are deemed to be strongholds of a particular candidate. Inordinate delays also
cast serious doubts on the authenticity of the result of a particular election and on the
electoral process in general.162 In Kenya, many parties, including the EMB, were unable
to understand why results from some constituencies had not been submitted when voting
had closed several hours earlier. During a press conference held two days after the
elections, Samuel Kivuitu, the chairperson of the EMB, expressed his concerns regarding
the delay in results coming from some constituencies, which were considered to be the
incumbent president’s strongholds:
As I told you previously, I am not happy to see results coming the way
they are coming because there’s no reason why results should be delayed.
There cannot be any excuse and I don’t find any excuse at all. Because the
sole purpose of introducing counting … at the polling station was to hurry
up the process. And, although I agree there was a challenge because this
time there were more voters, the turnout was higher than ever before. That
is no excuse for us to be here on a Saturday for elections we held on a
Thursday.163
¶36

People also expressed concerns over the delay in releasing results of the
presidential poll in Zimbabwe. In a legal challenge that the opposition filed in the High
Court of Zimbabwe,164 Justice Uchena stated:
In the absence of an [appropriate] explanation the delay between 29th
March and the 4th April 2008 seems to be unjustified and points to a lack
of inefficiency. The period between the holding of the elections and the
date of application is six days. Three other elections involving greater
numbers of candidates were processed and finalized at their levels within
162

See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, SOMALILAND: SEPTEMBER 29, 2005 PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTION ASSESSMENT REPORT 30 (delays in declaring poll results led to claims of “fraud” and
manipulation of votes in favor of the ruling party), available at
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Somaliland's 2005 Parliamentary Elections Assessment.pdf.
163 Kivuitu: I Do Not Know Where the Retuning Officers Are, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JRiEiyjZYfs> (last visited May 6, 2010).
164 Movement for the Democratic Change v. Chairperson of the Zimb. Electoral Comm’n, (2008) E/P
24/08, 4 (High Court) (Zimb.)
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two days of the date of the elections. The work to be done by the Chief
Elections Officer is made simpler by the counting and collation done at
polling stations and constituency levels. All he has to do is to verify and
display the constituency returns and add the figures thereon to identify the
winning candidate whom he should forthwith declare the President of
Zimbabwe. This task should all things being equal not have taken the
[EMB] up to the 4th April 2008 to announce the presidential results.165
The holdup in releasing results in both countries was interpreted as an intentional act by
some members of the EMB and the government to rig the elections in favor of the sitting
president.
¶37
While it took the Kenyan EMB three days to report the presidential results, the
process lasted much longer in Zimbabwe ─ almost five weeks to tally results of the first
round of the presidential election. One could argue that the apparent delay in announcing
the results in Zimbabwe was due to a request by the ZANU-PF for a recount of ballot
boxes166 in twenty-three of the 210 constituencies167 (eleven percent).168 However, this
claim is not easy to sustain, considering the date of the request for the recount, April 12,
2008, and the date the final result was declared, May 2, 2008. For a recount to be carried
out in any election there must be a result that a party wishes to challenge. That party must
convince the EMB that an improper initial count likely affected the outcome of the
election.169 It is reasonable to assume that the EMB can make this judgment only if the
most votes have been counted. Thus, the EMB in Zimbabwe must have counted the votes
from almost all constituencies by April 12, 2008. It is difficult to understand how it could
have taken the EMB over three weeks to compute the results from twenty-three
constituencies, when it had taken them only two weeks to compute the results from
nearly 230.
¶38
One could imagine that part of the reason for not releasing the results promptly in
Zimbabwe was to avoid a repeat of the bloodbath that had occurred in Kenya in the wake
of the flawed presidential election. The EMB’s concern was to ensure a proper process
from start to finish. To avoid the appearance of fraud, the board had to be especially
meticulous when tallying the votes. Thus, additional time was required. Although this
assertion sounds credible at face value, it is undermined by the fact that it took the EMB
just two days to declare the outcome of the run-off, in which roughly an equal number of
votes was cast.170
¶39
Simply put, there were no valid reasons for the delay in declaring presidential
results in these countries, especially considering that these were not the first presidential
election held there.171 In particular, the delay in Zimbabwe was unacceptable. The
165

Id. at 11.
Electoral Act § 67A (2008) (Zimb.) (allowing parties to challenge the results from any constituency).
167 ZIMB. CONST. art. 61A(3) (2000).
168 Zimbabwe Election Recount Delayed, BBC, Apr. 21, 2008,
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7358420.stm (last visited Feb.
21, 2010).
169 Electoral Act § 67A(3) (2008) (Zimb.).
170 See supra Tables II & III.
171 Both of these countries have had a long experience with elections. See Goran Hyden & Colin Leys,
Elections and Single-Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania, 2 BRIT. J.POL.SCI. 389, 392-405
(1972) (discussing the 1969 elections in Kenya); Lionel Cliffe et al., Nationalist Politics in Zimbabwe: The
166
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inordinate delays made it difficult for the outcome of the elections to be accepted locally
and internationally. As the Kenyan experience demonstrates, the consequences of this can
be tragic. States in Africa cannot take comfort in the fact that delays in releasing the
results of a presidential vote have been noted on other continents.172 The next subsection
explores some of the measures that could be taken to ensure that election results are
reported expeditiously.
C. Checking Unwarranted Holdups
¶40

There are several steps that could be taken to ensure that the results of a
presidential election are declared promptly and accurately, thereby protecting the
integrity of the electoral process. Countries that seek to comply with the rule of law can
employ two legislative measures to rein in delays. The first measure relates to a point
made earlier: EMB officials must be selected on the basis of merit. Well-qualified EMB
officials would use their skills and expertise in a manner that would protect and promote
as well as strengthen the fundamental right to vote in accordance with international
norms.
¶41
The second measure relates to the manner in which results are communicated from
each polling station to the central tallying center. Once votes have been counted at the
polling stations or tallied at the constituency level, the EMB official in charge fills out a
form that describe the outcome of the presidential poll.173 He or she then takes this form
to the constituency or main EMB office for final tallying or formal announcement.174 The
time it takes an official to commute depends largely on where the person comes from. It
is reasonable to assume that those officials who are in remote parts of the country would
take hours or days to arrive at the central tallying center in the constituency or the main
office of the EMB. This is highly undesirable in view of the negative consequences of
failing to communicate results promptly.
¶42
The fact that the results of a presidential election need to be conveyed efficiently
and expeditiously cannot be overemphasized.175 As the Kriegler Commission stated,
effective communication between the EMB and the public could alleviate
“misconception, suspicion, rumour, and anger.”176 Indeed, the mode of communicating
results must be examined if any meaningful change is to be made to the voting process in
particular and the electoral framework in general. Electoral systems in Africa cannot
afford to continue using slow, unreliable modes of communication. Improved
communication, as evidence from several countries show,177 could enhance the reporting
1980 Elections and Beyond, 18 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 44, 44 (1980); Anthony Lemon, Electoral Machinery
and Voting Patterns in Rhodesia, 1962-1977, 77 AFR. AFF. 511, 511(1978).
172 See, e.g., Steven Rogers, Philippine Politics and the Rule of Law, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 111, 112-13 (2004)
(describing delay as the ‘“weakest link’” in the democratic process in the Philippines).
173 Electoral Act §§ 64(1), 65(6) (2008) (Zimb.); Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations of
Kenya, (2007) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg. §§ 35A(4), 40(1)(f).
174 Electoral Act §§ 64(2), 67(1) (2008) (Zimb.); Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations of
Kenya, (2007) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg. §§ 39(4), 40(1)(g)(ii).
175 See, e.g, THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, KENYA PRESIDENTIAL, PARLIAMENTARY AND
LOCAL ELECTIONS, DECEMBER 2007 40, available at http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Kenya's 2007
Presidental, Parliamentary and Local Elections.pdf.
176 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 10.
177 Klaas Walraven, The End of an Era: The Ghanaian Elections of December 2000, 20 J. CONTEMP. AFR.
STUD. 183, 186 (2002); Maya Roy, The State of Democracy After Disaster: How to Maintain the Right to
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of poll results. Countries such as Kenya must phase out “outdated methods”178 of tallying,
recording, transcribing, and transmitting results. Accordingly, there is a need to amend
the current electoral laws so as to introduce prompt and reliable methods of
communicating results such as e-mail, within the domestic electoral framework of Kenya
in particular. Indeed, in 2005, Kenya’s EMB made a similar recommendation.179 In
Zimbabwe, the issue is not lack of legislation, but rather the implementation of the law.
The Electoral Act permits counting and tallying officials to transmit results via quick
methods such as “electronic mail,”180 but there is scant evidence that they used this mode
of communication in 2008.181
¶43
Additionally, provisions should be made for the direct transmission of results from
polling stations to the main tallying center. In its report, the Kriegler Commission
recommended that a tallying system that could facilitate “secure simultaneous
transmission” of results from polling stations “to the national tallying centre”182 should be
developed immediately. As experience demonstrates, those procedures, which require
results from polling stations to be taken to constituencies for tallying, are not only timeconsuming,183 but are also prone to manipulation. In fact, the direct transmission of
results from polling centers has been used previously in Africa and elsewhere.184 In
Kenya this method was utilized successfully in 2005 for a referendum vote. Curiously,
the EMB failed to utilize it during the 2007 election. The International Foundation for
Electoral Systems (“IFES”), which observed the general election in Kenya, reported that
the EMB rejected its offer to “install a computer program that would have enabled
election officials in the constituencies to submit results electronically to Nairobi and then
on to a giant screen available to the public.”185
¶44
Although the reason for rejecting the IFES offer is still unclear,186 there are a
number of possibilities that could explain why this proposal was not accepted. Perhaps
officials of the EMB were ill-trained to use the technology. This relates to a point made
earlier: officials should be required by law to possess advanced computer skills. Indeed,

Vote for Displaced Citizens, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 203, 216-17, 229 (2007) (discussing elections in
Mexico and Iraq).
178 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 9.
179 Id. at 30 (“[T]he law should be amended to allow preliminary results by, [among others], email”
[quoting Electoral Commission of Kenya, Evaluation of the 2005 Referendum]).
180 Electoral Act § 67(1) (2008) (Zimb.).
181 The author noted this during two field studies in Zimbabwe in 2009.
182 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 10.
183 Id. at 135 (noting that, if there was delay in one polling station, this would have an impact on relaying
that constituency’s presidential result).
184 Interview with Peita Mamo, Australian Election Commission, in Sydney, Austl. (Oct. 2008) (stating
modern technology has been used to run elections successfully in countries like Australia).
185 INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN KENYA: A
REVIEW OF PAST EXPERIENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 135 (2008), available at
http://www.ifes.org/publication/077c11dc773ce6e94745f7ab711cf11e/IFES%20KENYA%20OSIEA_Aug2
2_FINAL.pdf. See also Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 135 (“[L]aptops were not used
for tallying at the constituency level, no WAN [Wide Area Network] was set up and the ECK opted for the
method that been used [previously]─and proved slow”).
186 See also Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 48 (“[W]hen the returning officers
gathered in Nairobi on 22 December 2007, some complained about the problems they would have using
computers, and the decision of 14 June 2007 [to use computers to transmit results] was revoked in
circumstances that are unclear”).
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the EMB itself had made this recommendation.187 Alternatively, perhaps the EMB
rejected this offer intentionally in order to make it possible to fix the presidential vote. As
the IFES noted, the use of modern technology could have made it “virtually impossible to
change results.”188 Arguably, the failure to embrace modern technology, and thereby
prevent voter fraud, is one of the factors that led to the violence in Kenya.
¶45
To ensure that results of the presidential election are communicated accurately,
expeditiously, and efficiently, steps must also be taken to insulate the voter database from
any external interference. Experience in South Africa189 and the Netherlands190 reminds
us that hackers can gain access to and interfere with computerized voter databases.
Additionally, because “software is notoriously subject to defects causing programs to
malfunction,”191 the continuous monitoring and review of the entire system is of upmost
importance. These measures would contribute to ensuring that electoral systems meet
international and domestic legal requirements on free and fair elections. However, as of
now, the Kriegler Commission report describes the EMBs accurately in both Kenya and
Zimbabwe: “a traditional organization, with inadequate flows of information, averse to
even minimal risks and to the use of technology, functioning in a compartmentalized
fashion.”192
¶46
To move beyond this situation, EMB officials must implement the measures
suggested in this section on the ground. For these measures to succeed, states must invest
in computer software that supports the instant tabulation and reporting of results.
Measures such as these would contribute significantly to ensuring that the outcome of the
presidential vote is communicated promptly and accurately from the polling station to the
main office of the EMB and, ultimately, to the people.
IV. THE EXPERIENCE OF VOTERS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION, AND
HARASSMENT
¶47

Free and fair elections require a level playing field for all presidential candidates.
This is important in view of the fact that incumbent presidents normally wield
considerable power and influence, which they can use to manipulate the electoral process.
In order to guard against this, international and domestic electoral laws require elections
to be fair193 in the sense that each candidate or political party has equal access to public
resources such as media,194 security, and funding.195 Elections must also be free.196 In
187 Id. at 136 (quoting Electoral Commission of Kenya, Report on the National Referendum Evaluation
Workshop). .
188 INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, supra note 185.
189 LAURENCE PIPER, SOUTH AFRICA’S 2004 ELECTION: THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 13
(Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2005).
190 See Rop Gonggrijp et al., Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B Voting Computer─A Security Analysis (2006),
available at http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf.
191 Michael Carrier, Vote Counting, Technology, and Unintended Consequences, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 645,
652 (2005).
192 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 49.
193 CONSTITUTION, Art. 42(A) (2008) (Kenya); UGANDA CONST. art. 61(a) (1996); ZIMB. CONST. art. 61(4)
(2008). See also ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 24; UDHR, supra note 2, art. 21.
194 See, e.g., Electoral Act § 3 (2008) (Zimb.); UGANDA CONST. art. 67(2), 67(3) (1996); Broadcasting Act
of 1999, § 2 (S. Afr.).
195 See, e.g., Electoral Law, No. 20/2002, art. 7(1)(v) (2002) (Mozam.).
196 CONSTITUTION, Art. 42A (2008) (Kenya); NAMB. CONST. art. 28(4) (1990); ZIMB. CONST. art. 61(4)
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particular, candidates and their supporters must be able to solicit for votes from any part
of the country, without any fear of harassment or intimidation by state and non-state
actors.197 Meeting these objectives would ensure that the right to vote is not only
protected, but also promoted.
¶48
In many African states, acts of violence and intimidation and harassment of voters
are a common part of elections.198 Experience shows that perpetrators include both state
and non-state actors.199 Their deplorable actions have caused considerable damage to
property and have led to the loss of many innocent lives. Additionally, they undermine
the credibility of the process and “political development,”200 as well as erode the
legitimacy201 of the administration that is subsequently formed. Moreover, acts of
violence, intimidation, and harassment prevent some voters from participating effectively
in an election.
¶49
Although sitting presidents can use state resources to protect themselves,202 the
same cannot be said for opposition candidates, who often must hire private security
forces. Thus, it becomes extremely difficult and expensive for any opposition candidate
(2008); ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 25; UDHR, supra note 2, art. 21.
197 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, art. 19(1); Electoral Act § 134 (Zimb.) (2008); Offences Act, (1958) Cap. 66 § 9
(Kenya).
198 See generally Kjetil Tronvoll, Voting, Violence and Violations: Peasant Voices on the Flawed Elections
in Hadiya, Southern Ethiopia, 39 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 697 (2001); Joe Hanlon & Sean Fox, Identifying
Fraud in Democratic Elections: A Case Study of the 2004 Presidential Elections in Mozambique 6 (2006),
available at http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp8.2.pdf; Allen Keller& Samantha
Stewart, We Have Degrees in Violence: A Report on Torture and Human Rights Abuses in Zimbabwe (Dec.
2007), available at
http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publications/zimbabwe_20071201/zimbabwe_200711
30.pdf; Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, Election Violence, Monitoring of the Presidential and
Parliamentary Elections, Ghana, 2004 (Feb. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.ifes.org/publication/8e5ad1688b62c0f9c8e6599d3fc406c1/GhanaEVER.pdf; The Carter Center,
Observing the 2004 Mozambique Elections 37 (Oct. 2005), available at
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2218.pdf; European Union Election Observation Mission, Nigeria:
Final Report, Gubernatorial and State Houses of Assembly Elections, 14 April 2007, and Presidential and
National Assembly Elections, 21 April 2007 20-22 (2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/election_observation/nigeria/final_report_en.pdf;
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa Election Observer Mission Report, Madagascar Presidential
Elections17-18 (Dec. 3, 2006), available at http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/madeom2006.pdf.
199 See Jacqueline Klopp, “Ethnic Clashes” and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya’s Electoral
Despotism, 35 CAN. J. AFR. STUD. 473 (2001); Human Rights Watch, “They Beat me Like a Dog”:
Political Persecution of Opposition Activists and Supporters in Zimbabwe13-18 (Aug. 2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zimbabwe0808webwcover.pdf.
200 See Sue Downie, Cambodia’s 1998 Election: Understanding Why it is Not a Miracle in the Mekong, 54
AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 43, 53 (2000); see also Ulrich Mücke, Elections and Political Participation in
Nineteenth-Century Peru: The 1871-72 Presidential Campaign, 33 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 311, 312 (2001)
(acts of violence are inconsistent with “democratic decision making”).
201 See David Throup, Elections and Political Legitimacy in Kenya, 63 J. INT’L AFR. INST. 371, 387 (1993);
Fred Hayward & Ahmed Dumbuya, Changing Electoral Patterns in Sierra Leone: The 1982 Single-Party
Elections, 28 AFR. STUD. REV. 62, 82 (1985).
202 See also Michael O’Donovan, The Administration of Elections in Zambia, in ELECTIONS AND
DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA 25, 27-28 (Claude Kabemba ed., 2004); Commonwealth Observer Group,
Mozambique National and Provincial Elections 25 (Oct. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/217881/FileName/2009MozambiqueCOGReport.pdf (the ruling
party used “state resources” “in the conduct of its campaign”); Commonwealth Observer Group, Malawi
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections 29 (May 19, 2009), available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/211206/FileName/FINALREPORT.pdf (“[S]tate resources were
used to the undue advantage of the incumbent . . . [S]tate-owned media failed to provide balanced coverage
or reasonable access to all parties.”).
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and his or her supporters to campaign openly and without fear of attack.203 This state of
affairs limits opposition presidential candidates from enjoying the internationally
recognized right to participate in an election.
¶50
Claims of voter intimidation and harassment were made in both Kenya and
Zimbabwe. The Kriegler Commission noted that there was widespread political
“violence” and “voter intimidation” in the lead-up to the 2007 Kenya election.204
Opposition political parties in particular had a very hard time campaigning in areas that
were considered to be government strongholds.205 Some candidates and their supporters
suffered serious injuries at the hands of law enforcement officials and non-state agents
that the government was unwilling to control.206 Some people even alleged that
government officials had a direct hand in perpetrating acts of violence against opposition
members. For instance, it was claimed that the Minister of Roads and Public Works,
Simeon Nyachae, had incited youth to assault members of the opposition at a rally in his
hometown of Kisii on September 19, 2007.207 Those attacks left three members of the
opposition presidential campaign team with serious injuries.208 Although the Minister for
Internal Security at the time, John Michuki, claimed that investigations into the matter
were underway,209 not one arrest has been made, casting doubts on the authenticity of
these investigations and the sincerity of the Minister’s comments. In general, the events
surrounding the 2007 Kenya election raise questions over the commitment of politicians
to observe, respect, and promote provisions of the 2002 Electoral Code of Conduct,
which requires them to “avoid” and “prevent” acts of violence and intimidation.210
¶51
As was the case in Kenya, the periods preceding both rounds of the 2008
presidential election in Zimbabwe were marked by voter intimidation and violence
against the MDC and its supporters.211 Many were the victims of acts that amounted to

203 Interestingly, in Kenya, security concerns also forced the sitting president to suspend his campaign in
some opposition strongholds during the 2007 election. See PNU Puts Off Kisumu Rallies, DAILY NATION,
Oct. 8, 2007, available at http://multimedia.marsgroupkenya.org/?StoryID=197576&p=Rarieda&page=1.
204 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 58.
205 See ODM Injuries, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTtWS8PDWQk (last visited May 5,
2010); We Are Sorry for Violence, Meru Leaders Tell ODM, STANDARD, Nov. 1, 2007,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200710311006.html (last visited May 10, 2010).
206 See ODM in Meru, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WDh_5S19jFw (last visited May 5,
2010); Raila Seeks Votes in Kibaki’s Turf, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFj34sXnkOU
(last visited May 5, 2010).
207 See Kisii Violence Follow Up, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyBWi8Y-E_A (last
visited May 5, 2010); see also Nyachae Defends Attack/ Wamwere to Support Kibaki, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAGAgaQC1TU (last visited May 5, 2010).
208 Many condemned these attacks. See ODM Injuries, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTtWS8PDWQk (last visited May 5, 2010). See also Envoys Decry
Rise in Election Violence, STANDARD, Nov. 9, 2007,
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200711081114.html (last visited May 5, 2010); KNCHR Church Call
for Action on Inciters, STANDARD, Sept. 26, 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200709260010.html
(last visited May 5, 2010).
209 Attack on ODM Sparks Riots in Parts of the Country, DAILY NATION, Sept. 23, 2007,
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/multimedia/?StoryID=195308&storydate=2007-09-23 (last visited May 5,
2010).
210 Electoral Code of Conduct, (1997) ¶ 5(a) (Kenya).
211 Some contend that the “regime power in Zimbabwe has always been buttressed by coercion, chillingly
symbolized in ZANU-PF’s trademark emblem, the fist.” Michael Bratton & Eldred Masunungure,
Zimbabwe’s Long Agony, 19 J. DEM. 4, 50 (2008).
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torture,212 as well as mistreatment and beatings at the hands of the state-backed youth
militia.213 In particular, there was a dramatic increase in the level of threats and violence
just before the second round of voting, as the following narratives affirm:
The ZANU-PF youth used to go round residential estates in Harare
threatening people in their homes. They would also stop Mini-bus taxis,
flash out anyone who they thought was an MDC supporter and cane him
or her in public. The message was clear: vote for MDC and you will be in
big trouble. This created a lot of fear among the people. One night they
came to my house and forced me to pledge my loyalty to ZANU-PF. As I
was terrified, I did exactly what they demanded.214
I am a well-known opposition figure in my town. A few days to the
election ZANU-PF youth and Government soldiers came to my house at 4
a.m. They took me to the nearby river and directed me to swim. The water
was so cold, but I had to comply. Then they bound my hands with barbed
wire and instructed me to roll on the sand. It was quite painful, but what
could I do? After this ordeal I was taken to an army camp. They only gave
me water. My father, a ZANU-PF supporter, intervened, and I was
released. In total I spent four days in a cell. Immediately upon my release I
fled the country.215
At one of the rallies, which I attended, ZANU-PF youth came with guns.
They fired in the air and warned us that, if we did not vote for them, hondo
rikudzoka [war will come back]. This message scared many people. . . . I
also saw several patients, with injuries apparently inflicted by the youth, at
the local hospital where I was on attachment. One case in particular was
chilling. It involved a man who had burns all over his body, which were
inflicted by fire.216
¶52

Thousands of people, including women and children, were displaced because of
state-sanctioned violence.217 Some MDC officials were imprisoned on flimsy grounds.218
212 For the definition of “torture,” see Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
213 See Human Rights Watch, Bullets for Each of You: State-Sponsored Violence Since Zimbabwe’s March
29 Elections (Jun. 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zimbabwe0608.pdf;
Amnesty International, A Trail of Violence After the Ballot (2008), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,ZWE,,4847aa3a2,0.html; Int’l Federation of Human Rights,
Zimbabwe: Run up to the March 29 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections - A Highly Repressive
Environment for Human Rights Defenders (Mar. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47e0ea160.html.
214 Interview with Qubhekani, in Nata, Bots. (Aug. 12, 2009).
215 Interview with Chipiwa, in Francistown, Bots. (Jan. 3, 2010).
216 Interview with Kwanele, in Chinhoyi, Zimb. (Dec. 22, 2009).
217 See, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, The Many Faces of Displacement: IDPs in
Zimbabwe 13-16 (Aug. 2008), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,ZWE,,48ad3b70c,0.html.
218 UK Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report: Zimbabwe, at 27 (Sept. 29, 2008),
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
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Due to fears over his safety, Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition, fled to the Dutch
Embassy in Harare.219 It is disturbing to note that although some of the perpetrators were
identified by the victims, the police have not taken any steps to investigate these crimes
or arrest the suspects due to their association with the ruling party, ZANU-PF.220
¶53
Against this backdrop, it was highly unlikely for the run-off to be free and fair, as
required by election standards. The right to vote is “inconceivable without the [effective]
participation of a plurality of political parties representing the different shades of opinion
to be found within a country’s population.”221 However, the EMB, under Mugabe’s
influence, ignored calls by the international community and the MDC to postpone the
second round of the presidential election until the security situation improved.222 In the
end, the MDC withdrew from the run-off leaving Mugabe to compete in a one-horse
race.223 Although Table IV (above) shows that Mugabe won the second round by a
landslide, this outcome is not a reflection of the will of the electorate.
¶54
In many countries, acts of violence toward, and harassment and intimidation of,
candidates and their supporters are proscribed not only by electoral laws,224 but also by
criminal laws.225 In its general comment on voting rights, the UN Human Rights
Committee urged states to ensure that the laws and regulations that prohibit electoral
violence are “strictly enforced.”226 Unfortunately, this is a challenge for many African
states, as law enforcement officials are still too weak to prosecute politicians and their
criminal gangs. The Waki Commission found that law enforcement officials in Kenya in
particular are unable to discharge their mandate due to political interference.227 A senior
police officer who appeared before the commission testified to that effect:
Q: And you talked about some criminal gangs called Chikororo. Did you
monitor this gang?
A: [Yes]. [They] are used specifically when the elections are near, to scare
away potential voters who are against a particular candidate.
Q: And you do anything about that?
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=country&amp;docid=48e23adc2&amp;skip=0&amp;coi=ZWE&amp;
querysi=Tendai%20Biti&amp;searchin=fulltext&amp;display=10&amp;sort=date.
219 See Zimbabwe Opposition Leader in Hiding, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KJtN1SWaGiw (last visited May 5, 2010).
220 See, Human Rights Watch, “Our Hands are Tied”: Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe 26-31 (Nov.
2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/zimbabwe1108/zimbabwe1108web.pdf.
221 United Communist Party of Turkey v Turkey, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 146, 164 (1998).
222 See UN Says Fair Vote in Zimbabwe Impossible,YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhNeVw0YfQY (last visited May 5, 2010).
223 See Opposition Leader Pulls out of Zimbabwe Elections, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJp2B9ptGSw (last visited May 5, 2010).
224 See Electoral Act (2006) § 82(1) (Zambia); Election Offences Act, (1958) Cap. 66 § 9 (Kenya),
available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/frames.php; Electoral Act § 105 (2008) (Zimb.).
225 Penal Code, (1985) Cap. 63 §251 (Kenya); Public Order and Security Act § 17-19, 22 (2002) (Zimb.);
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 §§ 266, 267 (S. Afr.).
226 U.N. Human Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting
Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7(July 12,
1996).
227 Commission of Inquiry, supra note 12, at 457.
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A: We sort of arrested most of them, … and we had a lot of problems.
Q: You had what?
A: A lot of problems, because there was a lot of tension. We arrest,
pressure is put, I release them.
Q: When you talk about pressure, what kind of pressure was it?
A: You find that I get calls from Nairobi, my boss says, did you arrest
these people? I say, yes for this and that. Then he says, well, warn them,
let them go home. I comply.
Q: And you said your boss is the Police Commissioner.
A: [Yes]…
Q: Did you find any politicians who were either organizing or inciting
these particular youths?
A: My Lords, for this particular Chinkororo Hon. Nyachae was behind.
Q: And when you say behind, what exactly do you mean?
A: He is the one who organize[d], financed. They were known as his
people.
Q: And did you find any tangible evidence of this organization of
financing?
A: That is where the problem is, My Lords, because to get tangible
evidence was very difficult. But as we go along investigating, you come
across some evidence that so and so we have arrested that person, that
person is aligned to so and so. So you see a pattern. Of this group you
arrest, you see which group now turns up, making a lot of noise or even
calling my boss or whatever.
Q: Do you know that whoever was organizing them has direct connections
to your superiors, at least? …
A: What they were doing according to me is that, once we arrest, they
couldn’t call me direct, here in Kisumu. But there is a way of
circumventing [my office]. So it would come from my boss when I
report…. I will inform him I have all these people arrested, I have
detained them in this Police station, may be after a day he will call me and
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say, you remember those people you arrested, give them unconditional
release and I will comply and people will go.
Q: The issue I am putting to you obviously these people you were
arresting have direct connections to persons who are higher up, who are
able to talk or find their way to the Commissioner obviously, even if they
were not financing. At least you can say they had some influential
connections somewhere.
A: Yes. 228
¶55

Acts of violence and harassment against candidates and their supporters must be
deplored. Such an influence is both “unpleasant” and “undesirable.”229 These activities
are the “bluntest forms of state power to intimidate or defeat political opponents.”230 For
any presidential election to be free and fair, the playing field must be level. Research on
elections in many parts of the world has drawn this conclusion.231 Ban Ki-Moon, the
current UN Secretary General, stated that an election held in a violent environment
“lack[s] all legitimacy.”232 Flawed presidential elections have an impact on national and
international peace and security, as the post-election violence in Kenya and the
humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe show. Thus, it is in the interest of African states to
ensure that presidential elections are free from violence, intimidation, and harassment.
Toward this end, it is of utmost importance for political parties, as well as their
supporters and candidates, to respect the electoral rules. Additionally, all law
enforcement officials must be neutral. They should not attempt to influence or intimidate
any voter to cast his or her vote for a particular candidate.233 In keeping with their
constitutional mandate, they must provide security to voters and non-voters alike,
irrespective of their political affiliation. It is of grave concern that in both Kenya and
Zimbabwe law enforcement officials did not protect the people and, in the case of
Zimbabwe, actually perpetrated acts of violence against them.

228

Id. at 458-59.
See Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit, Unveiling the Vote, 20 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 311, 332 (1990). See also
Manson Nyamweya v. Joseph Magara, (2008) Election Petition 3 of 2008 35 (Kenya) (unreported)
(Musinga, J.) (terming political violence as “unaccepatable”).
230 See Tom Young, Elections and Electoral Politics in Africa, 63 J. INT’L AFR. INST. 299, 303 (1993).
231 See Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Election Observation Mission Report South Africa: National
and Provincial Elections, 12-14 April 2004 16-17 (2004), available at
http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/sa04eomr.pdf; Ronald King, Counting the Votes: South Carolina’s Stolen
Election of 1876, 32 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 169, 170 (2001); Neil Devotta, Sri Lanka’s Political Decay:
Analysing the October 2000 and December 2001 Parliamentary Elections, 41 COMMW. COMP. POL. 115
(2003).
232 Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Sec’y-General, Press Encounter After Security Council Luncheon (June 23, 2008),
available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=1178.
233 Several observers have deplored the political involvement of law enforcement officials. See,
Commonwealth Observer Group, Fiji Islands General Election, 6-13 May 2006 24, 25, 47 (2006),
available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Shared_ASP_Files/UploadedFiles/CA16B913-2D20-4058874A-52BBDE02BCD2_FijiGeneralElection2006-ReportoftheCommonwealthObserverGroup.pdf; The
Carter Centre, Observing the 2004 Mozambique Elections 65 (Oct. 2005), available at
http://cartercenter.com/documents/2218.pdf.
229
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V. RESOLVING ELECTORAL DISPUTES: PROCESS AND CHALLENGES
¶56

An independent judiciary is an essential ingredient in free and fair elections. Julius
Nyerere, a former president of Tanzania, argued that unless judges perform their work
“properly, none of the objectives of [a] democratic society” can be met.234 Accordingly,
any initiative that seeks to reform the electoral process in Africa must also focus on the
judicial system, due to the central role235 that courts play in the resolution of electoral
disputes in particular and the promotion and protection of democracy in general. Any
person who is dissatisfied with the result of a presidential election can challenge it in
domestic courts. Special courts are established in most African countries to handle such
claims.236 This section first discusses the process of challenging the results of a
presidential election. It then evaluates some of the factors that cast doubt on the ability of
courts to handle electoral disputes in accordance with due process considerations.
A. Process

¶57

Multiple procedures dictate the process of challenging the election of a president.
Once the EMB declares the results of the vote, any unsatisfied person can challenge this
outcome in court within a specified period of time.237 Essentially, election petitions
involve determining the “validity”238 of a poll. The burden of proof is on the person who
lodges the application to demonstrate that there was an irregularity in the electoral
process.239 The burden a petitioner must meet is a balance of probability, not beyond a
reasonable doubt.240 Those election petitions that fail to meet this burden are dismissed
with costs.241
¶58
Any aggrieved person can appeal the decision of the electoral court to an appellate
court.242 Only questions of law can be raised on appeal in Zimbabwe.243 In Kenya, by
contrast, because the law is silent on the scope of issues that an appellant can advance,
administrative law principles apply.244 Therefore, an aggrieved party could appeal the
234 JULIUS NYERERE, FREEDOM AND SOCIALISM 110 (1968).
235 See also Republic v. Returning Officer of Kamukunji, (2008)

eKLR 18 (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (describing
courts as a “pillar” of democracy”).
236 See CONSTITUTION, §§ 10, 44 (2008) (Kenya); Electoral Commission Act, (1996) sec. 18 (Zambia);
ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act 2001) art. 41(2)(b); Electoral Act § 161 (2008) (Zimb.).
237 See CONSTITUTION, § 44(1) (2008) (Kenya); National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, (2009)
Cap. 66 § 20(1)(a) (Kenya); Electoral Act, (2006) sec. 21(3) (Zambia); Electoral Act § 111 (2008) (Zimb.);
but see TANZ. CONST. art. 41(7) (1977) (prohibiting courts from inquiring into the election of a president).
238 See Matiba v. Moi, (1993) 1 K.L.R 525, 531 (Kenya); Thande v. Montgomery, (1969) 1 K.L.R. 341, 344
(Kenya).
239 National Assembly Elections (Election Petition) Rule, (1993) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg. 4(1)(b) (Kenya). See
also William Gitau v. George Thuo, (2008) Election Petition 10 of 2008 14 (Kenya) (unreported) (Kimaru,
J.) (“To discharge [the] burden, [a] petitioner must adduce evidence that establish the alleged election
offences.”)
240 See Mbowe v. Eliufoo, (1967) E.A.L.R. 240, 241 (Tanz.); Ayub Mwakesi v. Mwakweru Ali, (2008)
Election Petition 1 of 2008 70 (Kenya) (unreported).
241 See Electoral Act, (2006) sec. 105 (Zambia); National Assembly Election (Election Petition) Rule,
(1993) Cap. 7 Sub. Leg. 34 (Kenya).
242 National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, (2009) Cap. 66 § 23(1)(4) (Kenya); Electoral Act §
172(2) (2008) (Zimb.).
243 Electoral Act § 172(1) (2008) (Zimb.) (“[A] decision of the Electoral Court on a question of fact shall
be final.”).
244 See also Kipkalya Kones v. R, (2006) 3 K.L.R. 291, 293 (Kenya) (Kenya’s electoral commission is
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decision of an electoral court on grounds that the decision maker erred either in law or in
fact. Where it allows the appeal, the appellate court refers the petition back to the
electoral court if it made an error of law. Under such circumstances the electoral court
must re-adjudicate the challenge based on the guidance the appellate court provided. For
those cases where an appellate court finds that the electoral court made an error of fact, it
refers the matter to the EMB directly, with an order, for instance, to recount votes.245
¶59
The mandate of an electoral court is limited to determining whether the law was
complied with. Therefore, if the court determines that a person was unduly elected,
judges can only order the EMB to re-tally votes. Judges cannot declare that a particular
presidential candidate won the election.246 This authority rests solely with the EMB.
B. Challenges
¶60

Although the process appears straightforward in theory, several problems have
arisen in practice. This subsection evaluates issues surrounding the independence and
impartiality of courts and their ability to deliver justice promptly in election petitions.
1. Independence and Impartiality

¶61

As guardians of their countries’ constitutions247 and the rights of individuals, judges
must uphold the law at all times. This rule stems from the principle of separation of
powers. Under this doctrine, the three arms of government—legislative, executive, and
judicial—are required to be autonomous in their work. This requires each arm to guard
itself from undue influence by the others.248
¶62
The separation of powers is crucial in any constitutional state.249 Judicial
independence is particularly important, as without it, it would be difficult for an
individual to ensure the protection of his or her human rights from infringement by the
state.250 Indeed, judicial independence is the “lifeblood of constitutionalism.”251

“amenable” to “judicial review”).
245 See CONSTITUTION, Art. 10(3) (2008) (Kenya); Electoral Act § 111(2)(b) (2008) (Zimb.).
246 Id.
247 See also Joseph Kimani v. Attorney General, (2009) K.L.R. 1, 11 (Kenya) (describing courts as the
“ultimate custodian of the Constitution.”).
248 See also Queen v. Kirby ex parte Boilermaker’s Society of Australia (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254, 301 (Austl.)
(The doctrine of separation of powers requires the three arms of Government to be kept “separate and
distinct”).
249 In the United States, for instance, this point was emphasized during the debates over whether to ratify or
reject the Federal Constitution. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST
WITH LETTERS OF “BRUTUS” 234-40 (Terence Ball ed., 2006). Much later, Justice Brandeis stated that
separating the branches of government is crucial, not only to “avoid friction” between the three arms of
government, but also to “save the people from autocracy.” Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 106, 293 (1926); see
also HAMILTON, MADISON, & JAY, supra at 234-40 (“[T]he accumulation of all powers legislative,
executive and judiciary in the same hands [could lead to] . . . tyranny.”).
250 In order to cement the independence of the judiciary, judges in Kenya and Zimbabwe have life tenure,
subject to good behavior. See CONSTITUTION, Art. 62 (2008) (Kenya); ZIMB. CONST. art. 86-87 (2000); see
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982) (Brennan, J.) (“[T]he guarantee
of life tenure insulates the individual judge from improper influences not only by other branches but by
colleagues as well.”).
251 Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, 70 (Can.).
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¶63

Furthermore, the independence of the judiciary from the other arms of government
plays a central role in preserving and promoting the integrity of courts.252 Independence
also ensures that disputes are adjudicated based on their factual and legal merits, not on
political considerations. In other words, judges should be free to act on their “own
convictions, without any apprehension of personal consequences” to themselves.253
¶64
Charles Montesquieu claims that in comparison to the power of the other arms of
government, the power of the judiciary is “next to nothing.”254 However, this claim
underestimates the pivotal role that judges play in the protection and promotion of voting
rights. In particular, they are charged with the responsibility of adjudicating the
“validity”255 of a presidential election. An objective decision maker must ensure not only
that justice is done, but also that it is seen to be done. He or she must grant effective
remedy to a person whose rights and freedoms have been violated.256 Moreover,
confidence in the legal process is critical if such a person is to seek redress in the judicial
system. People, especially those who are aggrieved, must have a sense that electoral
courts will act independently and determine petitions based on well-established domestic
and international legal principles. As the Australian High Court once stated, “the
appearance of independence preserves public confidence in the judicial branch”257 as well
as in the law. In other words, public perception of bias by the judiciary should be
minimized, if not eliminated altogether. The parties to a petition and members of the
public should be confident that justice prevailed.
¶65
The opposition parties in Kenya and Zimbabwe employed two distinct approaches
in the wake of the flawed presidential election. Whereas the opposition party in Kenya
refused to seek relief in court, its counterpart in Zimbabwe chose to pursue a judicial
remedy. An evaluation of these approaches ultimately reinforces the argument that an
independent judiciary is an essential tool for democracy.
a) Writing Off the Judiciary: The “We Will Not Go to Court” Route
¶66

As one would have expected, the main opposition party in Kenya, the Orange
Democratic Movement (“ODM”), challenged the outcome of the 2007 presidential
election.258 Although one also would have expected the ODM to seek relief within the
local legal framework,259 the party refused to ventilate its grievance in “Kibaki’s courts,”
thus expressing a total lack of confidence in Kenya’s judiciary to resolve any challenge to
See also R v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office, (2008) 4 All Eng. Rep. 927, ¶ 76 (Eng.).
See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871); see also U.N. Cong. on the Prevention of Crime & the
Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary ¶ 2 (1985), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/indjudiciary.htm.
254 CHARLES MONSTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156 (2002).
255 SMT Indira Ghandi v. Shri Narain (1976) S.C.R. 347, 506 (Mathew, J.).
256 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 13, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
(Sept. 3, 1953); Chahal v. U.K., 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997); Conka v. Belgium, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54
(2002).
257 Wilson v. Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, (1989) 189 C.L.R. 1, 14.
258 See also Christopher Anderson & Silvia Mendes, Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes, Democratic
Experience and Political Protest Potential, 36 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 91, 107 (2005) (“[L]osers would be more
likely to protest against the political regime.”).
259 See generally Yaov Dotan & Menachem Hofnung, Legal Defeats─Political Wins: Why do Elected
Representatives Go to Court?, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 75 (2005); James Blumstein, The Supreme Court and
Voter Eligibility, in ISSUES OF ELECTORAL REFORM 33-48 (Richard Carlson ed., 1974).
252

253
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the election results independently and impartially. The ODM viewed the courts as an
instrument of the state that could not objectively adjudicate any petition that involved the
sitting president.260 Thus, the ODM believed that the solution to the flawed presidential
poll lay in engaging the government through peaceful protests rather than through
litigation. Their supporters took their dissatisfaction with the election results to the
streets. In response, the government declared that it would deal decisively with any
unauthorized or unlawful demonstration. It also argued that any aggrieved person should
seek relief in court: “Elections are over and our Constitution does say that once the
Electoral Commission has declared the results those are the results that we accept. If we
have any disputes, the normal way of resolving them is … by petitioning the High
Court.”261
¶67
Interestingly, the Vice President of Kenya, Kalonzo Musyoka, who was a
contender for the presidency in the 2007 election, echoed this viewpoint: “I am a lawyer.
I can even take instructions. And I can argue for [the ODM].”262 Some commentators
expressed similar sentiments. Peter Kagwanja, President of the Africa Policy Institute,
claimed that the domestic legal framework was the proper forum for resolving electoral
disputes.263 Kagwanja asserted that “giant strides” had been made since Kenya’s
independence in 1963 to set up “a functioning modern” judicial system.264 Thus, people
must respect court decisions, “however sleazy” they may be.265 To support this assertion,
Kagwanja cited the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore,266 where the central
issue was the tallying of votes in the state of Florida.
¶68
Bush has been the subject of wide discussion,267 and courts in Kenya could have
drawn from the rich jurisprudence that decision has generated. However, the assertion by
Kagwanja is narrow in the sense that he ignores the vital role that confidence in the
judiciary and court system plays in the litigation process. Indeed, courts worldwide have
underscored the value of public confidence on the judiciary. In their dissent in Bush,
Justices Breyer and Stevens describe belief in the judiciary as the foundation of the rule
of law.268 Canadian269 and Australian270 courts have also acknowledged that public
perception is a core component of the justice system. In the words of Justice Katju of the
Indian Supreme Court:

260 See also Independent Review Commission, supra, note 12, at 59 (The ODM “declared that it was not
possible to receive justice from a partisan judiciary that was known to subvert justice in electoral
matters.”).
261 See PNU and ODM-Kenya Speak, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S-tMBFV9-0Q (last
visited May 5, 2010).
262 See Kalonzo: ODM Should Go to Court, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aW0vYtYOR_k
(last visited May 5, 2010).
263 Peter Kagwanja, Breaking Kenya’s Impasse: Chaos or Courts?, 1 AFR. POL’Y BRIEF 1, 3-4 (2008).
264 Id. at 3.
265 Id.
266 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
267 See generally Anthony Laden, Democratic Legitimacy and the 2000 Election, 21 L. & PHIL. 197 (2002);
Jesse Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential Election of 2000, 18
CONST. COMMENT. 335 (2001); BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman, ed.,
2002).
268Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
269 See MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796 (Can.).
270 See Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1969) 189 C.L.R. 51, 118 (Austl.).
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It is of upmost importance for the public to have confidence in the
judiciary. The role of the judiciary is to resolve disputes amicably.
Without it, people may use violence to resolve differences. To avoid this,
the judiciary must be independent. This is an inherent trait. If a judge is
independent and knows the law, the losing party is likely to be pacified.
He or she will be content, notwithstanding the fact that he or she has lost
the action.271
¶69

Data from Africa272 and elsewhere273 demonstrate the importance of public trust in
the judiciary. People engage the judiciary because they have faith in the court system,274
and they believe their disputes will be resolved based on legal principles. In addition,
they trust that judges will be independent and not favor any party.275 Absent this trust, it
is doubtful that presidential candidates would ever seek relief in domestic courts.
¶70
Kenya’s judiciary has undergone a number of developments, including a
transformation from an all-white bench at the time of independence to a bench comprised
of native-born judges today. However, courts in Kenya and Zimbabwe do not have a
reputation of fairness and independence. Survey data suggest that many citizens do not
trust that courts and judges in Africa are autonomous in their work. In a survey conducted
in 2006 and 2007 among thirty-two African countries, including Kenya and Zimbabwe,
the Gallup Organization found that just over half of those polled (fifty-three percent)
expressed confidence in the judiciary in their country.276 Moreover, a number of studies
have established that courts in Kenya and Zimbabwe cannot discharge their mandates
impartially and independently. For instance, in its 2008 report, the Fund for Peace, a
nonprofit research and education organization, described the judiciary in Kenya and
Zimbabwe as “weak”277 and “poor,”278 respectively. The 2008 report of the Waki
271

Interview with Markandey Katju, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Jan. 27, 2009).
Richard Vengroff & Michael Magala, Democratic Reform, Transition and Consolidation: Evidence from
Senegal’s 2000 Presidential Election, 39 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 129, 147-56 (2001);
International Foundation for Election Systems, A Nigerian Perspective on the 2007 Presidential and
Parliamentary Elections: Results from Pre- and Post-Election Surveys 1 (2008), available at
http://www.ifes.org/publication/34df07e58b75b1f077da49901b958445/Nigeria%20elections%202007%20
way%20forward%20conf%20presentation%20FINAL.pdf (last visited May 5, 2010).
273 A.K.J. Watt, New Alignments in South Indian Politics, 42 ASIAN SURVEY 733, 746-748, 751 (2002);
James Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted
or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 539-545 (2003); Commonwealth Observer Group, Pakistan
National and Provincial Assembly Elections, Oct. 10, 2002 15 (2002), available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/document/176283/177346/35146/pakistan_2002_cog_report.htm (last
visited May 5, 2010).
274 See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Civil and
Political Rights, Including the Questions of Independence of the Judiciary, Administration of Justice,
Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/60 (Dec. 31, 2003) (prepared by Leandro Despouy) (“What is at stake is
the trust that the courts must inspire in those who are brought before them in a democratic society.”).
275 See Bruce Baker, Cape Verde: The Most Democratic Nation in Africa?, 44 J.MOD. AFR. STUD. 493, 496,
502-503 (2006); Keith Panter-Brick, Prospects for Democracy in Zambia, 29 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 231,
242 (1994); Nandini Patel et al., Consolidating Democratic Governance in Southern Africa: Malawi 43-45
(Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2007).
276 In South Africa, High Level of Confidence in Judiciary, GALLUP, Oct. 6, 2008,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/110968/South-Africa-High-Level-Confidence-Judiciary.aspx (last visited May
10, 2010).
277 The Fund for Peace, Country Profile: Kenya,
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36&Itemid=61 (last
272
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Commission observed that Kenya’s judiciary had “acquired the notoriety of losing the
confidence and trust of [its clientele] because of the perception that it is not
independent.”279 Legal practitioners argue that public confidence in the Kenyan judiciary
has “virtually collapsed.”280 Simply put, the judiciary in Kenya and Zimbabwe is facing a
crisis of confidence.
¶71
Judges, like all members of the public, are entitled to hold opinions and express
their views on any issue.281 However, as the South African Supreme Court cautions, the
conduct of judges should not in any way “compromise” the discharge of their duties.282 In
Kenya, the Chief Justice, Evan Gicheru, acted improperly in the wake of the disputed
presidential election. Within an hour of the EMB announcement that Kibaki had won the
2007 presidential election, Gicheru hurriedly swore him in at the Nairobi State House.283
Gicheru’s presence at the ceremony shattered the trust in the Kenyan judiciary of all
reasonable and informed people. His conduct contradicted his 2007 call that judges
should take their constitutional mandate seriously.284 More shockingly, his conduct
contradicted the judicial oath he had taken to uphold the Constitution and adhere to the
law “without fear or favor, affection or ill will.”285 In light of the conditions surrounding
the swearing in of Kibaki, it was doubtful that the judiciary would be impartial and
independent in deciding any petition that challenged his election. This was one of the
main factors that influenced the ODM’s decision not to seek relief in court.
b) Invoking the Court Process
¶72

Unlike the ODM in Kenya, the MDC in Zimbabwe did seek relief in court. As
discussed above, there was an inordinate delay in releasing the results of the first round of
the election. Thus, the MDC applied to the High Court for an order to compel the EMB to
release the presidential election results. In his judgment in Movement for the Democratic
Change v. The Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, Justice Uchena
found that there was indeed an inordinate delay in announcing the election results. He
visited May 5, 2008).
278 The Fund for Peace, Country Profile: Zimbabwe,
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=296&Itemid=458 (last
visited May 5, 2008).
279 Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence, supra note 12, at 460.
280 PETER ANNASI, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: THE KENYAN EXPERIENCE 84 (2004). These views are
consistent with earlier research on the credibility of Kenya’s judiciary. See also, REPORT OF THE INTEGRITY
AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY OF KENYA 36-37 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/Reports/Government/Ringera_Report.pdf.
281 See also Sean Macdonald, Balance and Independence: The Judicial Process in the Charter Era, 16
DALHOUSIE J. LEG. STUD. 161, 163 (2007) (describing the situation in Nova Scotia where the court runs a
website, which contains papers written by judges on “controversial matters”).
282 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Jacob Zuma 2009 (573/08) SA 1 (SAC) at 8 (S. Afr.). See
also Sylvia Bertodano, Judicial Independence in the International Criminal Court, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
409, 417 (2002) (“For a judge to describe as guilty a man whom his court has not yet tried suggests a lack
of the impartiality required of that judge at trial.”).
283 See also Nic Cheeseman, The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction, 2 J. E. AFR. STUD. 166, 166
(2008) (“On 30 December 2007, Kibaki’s second term began in a very different way. [Unlike in 2002 when
he was sworn in public,] this time the President was inaugurated in a hastily arranged ceremony at his
official residence.”).
284 Evan Gicheru, Independence of the Judiciary: Accountability and Contempt of Court, 1 KENYA L. REV.
1, 1 (2007).
285 See Oath of Allegiance for Judges (Kenya) (on file with author).
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stated that the EMB was “wasting time doing everything else other than what they should
have been doing,”286 namely, processing results. Citing section 67A(7) of the Electoral
Act, which provides that the decision of the EMB on whether or not to order a recount
“shall not be subject to appeal,” the High Court asserted that this subsection implied that
the decision of the board was “final.”287 In other words, it could not be challenged, even
in a court of law. According to Justice Uchena:
The provision barring an appeal simply means [the EMB] has been given a
very wide discretion as to whether or not to order a recount. The provision
that [the] decision [of the EMB] shall not be subjected to an appeal also
means that this court can not inquire into that decision. This should
therefore be the end of the inquiry, as the respondent’s conduct can only
be open to jurisdiction of this court when it strays from the law.288
Thus, the court dismissed the MDC application.
As the High Court pointed out, the statute purported to oust the jurisdiction of the
court in cases where a party had appealed the decision of the EMB. However, the EMB in
Zimbabwe is not immune from judicial review289 under section 67A(7) of the Electoral
Act. The High Court Act (1981) of Zimbabwe, which grants the court the general power
to review “proceedings and decisions” of “administrative authorities,”290 reinforces this
argument. In Movement for the Democratic Change the MDC was not appealing a
decision of the EMB, as a decision had yet to be handed down. Rather, it was seeking an
order of mandamus to compel the EMB to perform its constitutional duty — declare the
result of the presidential vote. Instead of invoking an inapplicable provision of the law, a
neutral judge would have construed the statute objectively.
¶74
The rule of law requires decisions to be somewhat “predicable.”291 To put it in
another way, judges should not decide cases arbitrarily.292 In keeping with the golden rule
of statutory construction, they must not arrive at an absurd interpretation of the law.293
Moreover, decision makers must conduct real analysis.294 Towards this end, before
arriving at a decision, Justice Uchena was required to apply relevant legal tests
objectively to the facts of the case.295 However, it is doubtful that an objective decision-

¶73

286

Movement for the Democratic Change v. Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, (2008)
E/P 24/08, 4 (High Court) (Zimb.).
287 Id. at 14.
288 Id.
289 See Black’s Law Dictionary 105, 864 (8th ed. 2004) (explaining the difference between appeal and
judicial review).
290 High Court Act §§ 26, 27 (1981) (Zimb.).
291 Jaisinghani v. Union of India, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 703, 718 (India).
292 See also Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 5.2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/65 (Nov. 25, 2002)
(prohibiting judges from considering “irrelevant grounds” when writing their decisions.)
293 Turner v. Hellard, [1885] 30 Ch.D. 390, 393-94 (U.K.); Coopers and Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA
761, 767 (S. Afr.); Mohammed v. Bakari and 2 Others, (2008) 3 K.L.R. 54, 68 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987).
294 See Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 2 A.C. 147, 199 (U.K.); Darling
Casino Ltd v. New South Wales Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 C.L.R. 602, 635 (Austl.). See also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (Judges “must of necessity expound and interpret” legal
rules.).
295 See also Plaintiff S157 v. Commonwealth (2003) 211 C.L.R 476, 494 (Austl.) (people “are ordinarily
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maker would have reached a conclusion similar to that of the Movement for the
Democratic Change court.
¶75
The second criticism against the decision in Movement for the Democratic Change
stems from the High Court’s treatment of the ouster clause. As the court pointed out,
ouster clauses such as 67A(7) of the Electoral Act do not entirely remove the decision of
an administrative authority from the scrutiny of courts. To pass constitutional muster,
decisions of administrative bodies must comply with due process considerations. These
outcomes should also be fair and reasonable. This general canon is well-established
within both common law countries such as the United Kingdom,296 Australia,297 and
Kenya298 and non-common law countries such as South Africa.299 It is unsatisfactory for a
Superior Court merely to recognize the existence of an ouster clause, and the grounds
upon which it can intervene. The supervisory function of the High Court required Justice
Uchena to have carefully evaluated the evidence presented and used it to decide whether
the conduct of the EMB was consistent with the law.
¶76
Justice Uchena acknowledged that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the
EMB in declaring the outcome of the presidential poll.300 Nonetheless, the judge failed to
conduct further inquiry into this delay, contrary to the requirements of the constitution.
The mere declaration by the judge of the legal position was insufficient. As the U.K.
House of Lords has emphasized, a decision-maker must deliver “substantial” justice.301 In
other words, the adjudication process should be more than a mere formality. Few would
deny that the narrow approach that Justice Uchena adopted can stifle democracy and
human rights as well as the development of jurisprudence in those fields.302
Unfortunately, that approach is not unique to Zimbabwe. Similar trends have been noted
elsewhere in Africa.303
¶77
Real independence implies that judges should make decisions or conduct review
applications “based on the backdrop of the Constitution and precedent without fear of
retribution by either the legislative or executive branches.”304 A judge adjudicating an
electoral dispute should always be “conscious” that the decision he or she hands down
“transcends private rights and defends the constituency and the democracy of the
entitled to expect more than good faith” from courts.).
296 Anisminic Ltd., 2 A.C. at 170.
297 R. v. Hickman (1945) 70 C.L.R. 598, 615 (Austl.); Plaintiff S157/2002 v R (2003), 211 C.L.R. 476,483
(Austl.).
298 CONSTITUTION, Art. 123(8) (2008) (Kenya); see also Kipkalya Kones v. R., (2006) 18 (C.A.K.)
(unreported) (Kenya).
299 See S. AFR. CONST., §§ 33 (1), 34 2008.
300 Movement for the Democratic Change v. The Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission,
(2008) E/P 24/08 at 4 (High Court) (Zimb.).
301
Arthur Spackman v. The Plumstead District Board of Works, [1885] 10 A.C. 229, 240 (U.K.).
302
U.S. v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 102 (1951) (The conduct of the decision maker also affirms Justice
Minton’s argument that a judge who is not independent can act irrationally.).
303
See, e.g., Peter Vondoepp, Politics and Judicial Assertiveness in Emerging Democracies: High Court
Behavior in Malawi and Zambia, 59 POL. RES. Q. 389, 395 (2006) (“Judges . . . appear to be acting
strategically in Zambia, deferring to government when the executive‘s interests seem apparent, but turning
their backs on government in those rare instances when it appears that the incumbent is about to lose
power.”).
304
Judge Paul J. Kelly, A Discussion of Judicial Independence with Judges of the United States Court of
Appeal for the Tenth Circuit,” 74 DEN. U. L. REV. 355, 356 (1997). See also R v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
673 (Can.).
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country.”305 There is no evidence to suggest that the Zimbabwean judiciary in this
instance was under any outside influence. However, it is arguable that it was not entirely
independent because Mugabe had announced in the past that his administration would not
respect court decisions that were contrary to the ideals of his government.306 Further, as
noted above, evidence shows that the judiciary in Zimbabwe is not independent. Thus, it
is doubtful that the resolution of this electoral dispute gave the petitioners or the public
the impression that the court was fair.
¶78
Decision makers should be independent to the extent that they can rule “against”
the state.307 The decision of the High Court in Movement for the Democratic Change
affirms the idea that decision makers “who are afraid cannot adequately fulfill the
considerable responsibilities that the position demands.”308 The decision also affirms the
idea that in countries where the judiciary is firmly “under the control” of the state, any
action against the government or its officials is futile.309 Some argue that in Bush v. Gore,
the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court was determined to rule in favor of Bush.310
Likewise, in Movement for the Democratic Change, the Zimbabwean High Court was
determined to rule in favor of Mugabe.
2. Timeliness
¶79

It is in the interest of justice for claims to be adjudicated promptly by courts and
tribunals. As the legal maxim “justice delayed is justice denied” implies,311 the right to a
fair hearing requires proceedings to be conducted expeditiously.312 Thus, in the context of
elections, the law in Kenya and Zimbabwe requires petitions to be heard and determined
expeditiously.313 However, despite this legal requirement, election challenges are rarely
adjudicated promptly.
¶80
Table V (below) shows the length of time it has taken courts in Kenya to hear and
rule on election petitions filed after the establishment of multi-party elections in 1992.
The sample size – twenty-five petitions – is small, but the data provides valuable insight
into national trends.
Table V
305

Mohinder Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, (1948) 1 S.C.C. 405, 421 (Iyer, J.) (India).
U.S. State Department, Zimbabwe: 2005 Investment Climate,
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2005/42203.htm (no longer available). See also Kaunda v President of the
Republic of South Africa 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) at 269 (S. Afr.) (arguing that the Mugabe administration
had previously “ignored” court orders).
307
Republican Party v. Malawi Electoral Commission and Others (Constitutional Case No. 5), 33 (Malawi
High Ct. 2004).
308
Sandra Day O'Connor, Op-Ed, The Threat to Judicial Independence, WALL STREET J., Sept. 27, 2006, at
A18.
309
Rok Ajulu, Kenya’s Democracy Experiment: The 1997 Elections, 25 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 275, 283
(1998).
310
Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons From the 2000 Presidential Election, 29 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 975,
991 (2002).
311 Edwin Abuya, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Status Determination Imtaxaan in
Kenya: An Empirical Survey, 48 J. AFR. L. 187, 196 (2004).
312 UDHR, supra note 2, art. 10; ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 14.
313 National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, (2009) Cap. 66 §§ 19(4), 23(6) (Kenya); Electoral
Act § 172 (3) (2008) (Zimb.).
306
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Resolution of Election Petitions in Kenya
Time (Years)
Number of Petitions
Number of Petitions
(First Instance)
(Appeal)
<1

7314

7315

1-2

16316

1317

2-3

1318

1319

>3-4

1320

0

¶81

Although some petitions (twenty-eight percent) were decided speedily at first
instance,321 it took over one year to adjudicate most petitions (sixty-four percent),
notwithstanding the fact that courts are required to give election petitions “priority.”322 In
particular, the cases of Mwangola323 and Omar,324 which took about three and four years,
respectively, for courts to hear and rule on, are quite troubling. The record of the appeal
court is much better than that of the court of first instance. Most appeals (seventy-eight
percent) were decided within one year. However, it took the appeal court three years to
hand down a decision in Moi,325 despite the legal requirement for appeals to be heard and
determined expeditiously.326
¶82
A holistic examination of the system suggests that it is plagued by serious delays.
For example, it took three years, including both stages of the process, for courts to reach
314

Murathe v. Macharia, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 244 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Muiya v. Nyaga, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 493
(C.A.K.) (Kenya); Chelaite v. Njuki, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 103 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Joho v. Nyange, (2008) 3
K.L.R. 188 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Libasia v. Wekesa, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 196 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Njeru v. Muturi,
(2008) 2 K.L.R. 504 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Shakombo v. Mwawlala, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 558 (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
315 Matiba v. Moi, (2008) 1 K.L.R. 670 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Maitha v. Said, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 337 (C.A.K.)
(Kenya); Kibaki v. Moi, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 301 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Chelaite v. Njuki, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 103
(C.A.K.) (Kenya); Omar v. Mbuzi, (2008) 3 K.L.R. 269 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Mutani v. Ntwiga, (1999) Civil
Appeal No. 99 (Kenya) (unreported); Murathe v. Macharia, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 244 (Kenya).
316 Manduli v. Machayo, (2008) 1 K.L.R. 510 (Kenya); Nyamweya v. Oluoch, (2008) 1 K.L.R. 580
(Kenya); Kajembe v. Nyange, (2008) 1 K.L.R. 1 (Kenya); Shakombo v. Mwawlala, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 558
(Kenya); Asiko v. Electoral Commission of Kenya, (1998) Election Petition No. 1 (Kenya) (unreported);
Wekesa v. Onsera, (1993) Election Petition No. 39 (Kenya) (unreported); Kyengo v. Kithonga, (1993)
Election Petition No. 36 (Kenya) (unreported); Obongita v. Maiyole, (1993) Election Petition No. 42
(Kenya) (unreported); Elima v. Kombo, (1994) Election Petition No. 64 of 1993 (Kenya) (unreported);
Kibaki v. Moi, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 301 (Kenya); Matoke v. Akoi, (2008) 1 K.L.R. 616 (Kenya); Ntwiga v.
Musyoka, (2008) K.L.R. 276 (Kenya); Onalo v. Wanjala, (2005) Civil Appeal Number 215 of 2003 (Kenya)
(unreported); Mutani v. Ntwiga, (1999) Civil Appeal No. 99 (Kenya) (unreported); Mwau v. ECK, 1 K.L.R.
691 (2008); Gakunga v. Maina, (2008) 1 K.L.R. 520 (Kenya).
317 Onalo v. Wanjala, (2005) Civil Appeal Number 215 of 2003 (Kenya) (unreported).
318 Shimbwa v. Mwangola, (1993) Election Petition No. 11 (Kenya) (unreported).
319 Moi v. Mwau, (2005) Civil Appeal Number 131 of 1994 (Kenya) (unreported).
320 Omar v. Mbuzi, (2008) 3 K.L.R. 269 (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
321 Chelaite v. Njuki, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 103 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Libasia v. Wekesa, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 196
(C.A.K.) (Kenya); Murathe v. Macharia, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 244 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Muiya v. Nyaga, (2008) 2
K.L.R. 493 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Joho v. Nyange, (2008) 3 K.L.R. 188 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Njeru v. Muturi,
(2008) 2 K.L.R. 504 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); Shakombo v. Mwawlala, (2008) 2 K.L.R. 558 (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
322 National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, (2009) Cap. 7 §19 (4) (Kenya).
323 Shimbwa, supra note 318.
324 Omar, supra note 320.
325 Moi, supra note 319.
326 National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, (2009) Cap. 7 § 23(6) (Kenya).
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a decision on the petitions in Onalo327 and Omar.328 Interestingly, the Chief Justice of
Kenya has deplored this state of affairs.329 Moreover, at hearings before the Waki
Commission, members of the public accused the judiciary of delaying the “administration
of justice.”330
¶83
Courts that hear election petitions must work toward ensuring that justice is
delivered swiftly. The situation in Kenya, as illustrated in Table V, cannot be maintained
by a state that holds itself up as a democratic country.331 Kenya must match its words
with concrete action. Under the law, the candidate whom the EMB declares to be the
winner continues to hold office until a court finds an error in the electoral process. If the
court delays reaching a decision, the consequences are widespread. First, delays in
adjudicating election petitions have an impact on the fundamental right of citizens to
choose their representatives. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers (“UN Special Rapporteur”) stressed that slow progress and delays in the
execution of judicial tasks could “result in a denial of justice.”332 Second, delayed justice
denies a winning candidate the chance to represent his or her constituents in particular
and the public in general. Third, delayed justice affects candidates on a personal level. A
candidate whom a court finds to have won an election is rarely awarded damages to
compensate him or her for lost income. Even if such a candidate is awarded damages,
they are typically insufficient. Conversely, a candidate whom a court finds was elected
wrongly is usually not required to return the income he or she received while in office. In
such cases, delayed justice leads to unjust enrichment.
¶84
Finally, as the European Court of Human Rights has stated, if electoral disputes are
not determined expeditiously, democracy itself “suffers.”333 If the public is represented
by an individual whom the majority did not elect, that seriously undermines the
individual right to vote and be represented by a person of his or her choice. Moreover, the
“slow pace” of adjudicating election petitions could fuel “cynicism about the
commitment of the government and the courts to resolve electoral disputes.”334 This
cynicism is well-founded because a person who has been elected improperly can
influence the court process using state resources.335

327

Onalo, supra note 317.
Omar, supra note 320.
329 See Beauttah Omanga, Winning Election Petition No Easy Task, STANDARD, Dec. 21, 2008, at 26,
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=1144002287&cid=289&.
330 Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence, supra note 12, at 461. Unfortunately, similar
trends have been reported in other African states. Richard Joseph, Challenges of a “Frontier” Region, 19 J.
DEM. 94, 102 (2008) (“After the 1999 and 2003 balloting [in Nigeria], election tribunals adjudicated
challenges so slowly that dishonest results became faits accomplis”); MINNEH KANA ET AL., SIERRA LEONE:
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT 13-14 (2004).
331 CONSTITUTION, Art. 1A (2008) (Kenya).
332 Despouy, supra, note 274 at ¶ 35.
333 ZDanoka v. Latvia, 45 E. H.R. Rep. 478, 525 (2007).
334 The Carter Center, Observing the 2001 Zambia Elections 53 (2002), available at,
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1135.pdf (last visited May 19, 2010).
335 Research on Nigeria supports this position. See Rotimi Suberu, Nigeria’s Muddled Elections, 18 J. DEM.
95, 104 (2007).
328
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C. Restoring and Supporting Judicial Independence

¶85

The independence of the judiciary is not only advantageous to courts, but also is of
great benefit to litigants, the general public, and the international human rights
movement. Thus, courts must take a lead role in ensuring that the right to vote is
respected, protected, and promoted at all times.336 In keeping with their oaths of office,
judges must defend the constitution of their countries. They must be bold spirited. Their
decisions must be grounded on sound legal reasoning. They should be prepared to make
decisions that do not sit well with the administration in power. A judge should “feel
compelled to select” those constitutional “values and principles” that promote “equality
and dignity.”337 However, for this objective to be realized, an enabling environment must
exist. This subsection evaluates some of the judicial reforms that could be adopted as a
means of achieving this goal. These initiatives could restore and promote public
confidence in, and guarantee the independence of, the court system. Improvements could
also ensure that decisions are based on the rule of law.
¶86
Transparency and promptness are essential components of an efficient system of
justice.338 Although the judiciary in most African states is independent, practice suggests
that judges are still vulnerable to influence from the executive. This could be traced to the
fact that members are appointed by the president.339 However, all appointees must meet
certain legal requirements, including having practiced law for at least seven years.340 In
both Kenya and Zimbabwe, the president is required to consult the Judicial Service
Commission (“JSC”), but this legal requirement falls short of guaranteeing the judiciary
complete independence, as the president also appoints members of the JSC.341 Indeed, the
ability of JSC officials to be independent in this kind of environment is doubtful.342
Moreover, it is doubtful whether any real consultations occur before a judge is appointed
into office in either country. Even if the JSC were to act independently, its advice would
not legally bind the president.343 In other words, under the current legal framework the

336 As

experience in Malawi shows, an objective judiciary can play a central role in protecting democracy.
Siri Gloppen & Edge Kanyongolo, The Role of the Judiciary in the 2004 General Elections in Malawi,
(Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights, Working Paper No. 16, 2004), available
at http://www.cmi.no//publications.
337 Jackie Dugard, Judging the Judges: Towards an Appropriate Role for the Judiciary in South Africa’s
Transformation, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 965, 981 (2007).
338 U.N. Human Rts. Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil and Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/4
(May 13, 2008).
339 See CONSTITUTION, Art. 61 (2008) (Kenya); TANZ. CONST. art. 118 (1977); ZAMBIA CONST.
(Constitution Act 1991) § 84.
340 CONSTITUTION, Art. 61(3)(b) (2001) (Kenya); ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act 1991) art. 82(1)(b).
341 CONSTITUTION, Art. 68 (2008) (Kenya); ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act 1991) art. 90.
342 See also International Crisis Group, Post-Election Zimbabwe: What Next? 8 (2009), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/southern_africa/093_post_election_zimbabwe__what_
next.pdf (contending that the JSC is “largely dominated by ZANU-PF sympathizers”); Commonwealth
Observer Group, Swaziland National Election 6 (2008), available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/184644/FileName/SwazilandNationalElections2008CETReportFinalPrint.pdf (“This appointment system has the potential to ultimately undermine the
independence of the judiciary”).
343 Makau Mutua, Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya, 23 HUM.
RTS. Q. 96, 104 (2001).
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president can appoint a judge for purely political reasons as long as the appointee meets
the minimum requirements for the position.
¶87
Although judicial reforms could be counterproductive in transitional states,344 it is
apparent that changes must be made to the courts if the rule of law is to prevail in Africa.
For the judiciary to be fully independent, as envisioned by international human rights
laws,345 it is imperative to review the selection process.346 Indeed, there is a need to divest
the president of power over the system.347 Kenya and Zimbabwe could adopt the
Zambian model where, in addition to the president, the legislature is involved in the
selection of judges.348 Moreover, to guard against the majority party in the legislature
wielding excessive power, Kenya and Zimbabwe could adopt the South African model,
which requires the president to consult with all the leaders of the parties represented in
parliament.349 Finally, to promote competency and professionalism in the bench, an
independent appointment committee that includes members of the bar and civil society
could be constituted to screen appointees, as is the case in South Africa. 350
¶88
The criteria that judges must meet are another issue for consideration. In the words
of Joy (pseudonym), a Kenyan decision-maker, “Part of the problem lies in the
appointment process. It is a political process and the judges are reluctant to lose their pay
pack. They would rather play ball. It is who lobbies for whom. There is no vetting. If it
was on merit, you really have nothing to fear.”351
¶89
At present, the bar is too low. It needs to be raised to ensure that only the best
candidates are appointed to the courts. Appointees should be selected on the basis of their
records, which should demonstrate work of superior quality. It is not sufficient for judges
to possess merely “appropriate training and qualifications of the law,” as some suggest.352
The proposal by the Kreigler Commission that those who judge a contested election have
expertise in election law353 should be implemented, as it would enable courts to deal
expeditiously with any possible legal objection, some of which could prolong the court
process unnecessarily. Further, a judge should demonstrate that he or she embodies
qualities such as transparency, integrity, independence, and high moral standing, as well
as personal technical skills.354 He or she should also be willing to collaborate with other
344

U.N. Human Rts. Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, ¶ 22 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/25 (Jan. 18, 2007) (prepared by Leandro Despouy); Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Civil and Political Rights, Including the
Questions of Independence of the Judiciary, Administration of Justice and Impunity, ¶ 27, U.N.Doc.
A/62/207 (Aug. 8, 2007).
345 See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 2, art. 26; Convention on the
Rights of the Child, art. 37, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989);
ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 14.
346 Commonwealth Observer Group, supra note 6, at 9.
347 Evidence from Mexico suggests that this approach could enhance the independence of the judiciary.
Pilar Domingo, Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in Mexico, 32 J. LATIN AM.
STUD. 705, 712-15 (2000).
348 ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act 1991) art. 93(1). Research conducted in Zambia suggests that this
procedure could have a positive impact on the judiciary. Vondoepp, supra note 303, at 397.
349 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 174(3)-(4).
350 Id. at § 178 (1).
351 Author interview with Joy, in Eldoret, Kenya, (Feb. 7, 2009).
352 See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, KENYA: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, CORRUPTION
AND REFORM 24 (2005), available at http://icj.org/IMG/pdf/kenyareport.pdf.
353 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 141-142.
354 For a wider discussion of this theme, see Simon Evans & John Williams, Appointing Australian Judges:
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judges.355 Lastly, the selection process should be transparent, and interviews should be
open to the public. Anyone seeking public office should be subjected to “public scrutiny”
about why he or she wants the position and the “qualities of competence” he or she would
offer.356
¶90
These initiatives would strengthen the rule of law and democracy in Africa.
Additionally, they would increase the speed with which courts decide election disputes.
Zambian law requires electoral challenges to be heard and determined within six months
of filing.357 The Kriegler Commission made a similar recommendation.358 Adopting these
initiatives would enable Kenya and Zimbabwe to achieve that goal.
VI. CONCLUSION: MAKING TOUGH CHOICES
¶91

This article has set out to evaluate changes that could be made to strengthen the
fundamental right to vote in Africa. The analysis in this paper has demonstrated that the
institutions that decided the recent elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe failed to do so in
manner that gained the acceptance of the nation and the international community. A wide
range of suggestions for improvements have been made. These suggestions could be of
great benefit to both individual states and the international community, as they could
contribute to preventing a repeat of the human rights violations that characterized the
presidential elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe. The challenge lies in implementing these
suggestions. A bold administration is required to do so in a way that strengthens human
rights. However, it must be emphasized that legal action alone will not automatically
guarantee a free and fair presidential election.359 Rooting out the long “culture of
electoral lawlessness” requires “concerted, non-partisan commitment to electoral
integrity on the part of political leaders”360 as well as the general public and other
governmental and non-governmental agencies.
¶92
Doubtless, the task ahead is colossal. There are no simple, quick solutions,
especially for countries where the president has considerable influence over key
institutions such as the police force, the EMB, and the judiciary.361 If impunity is to be
fought full-force, tough choices must be made. Government agencies and courts must
discharge their duties without fear or favor. They must be accountable for their acts and
omissions. Moreover, cronyism must give way to professionalism. Part of the solution
lies in changing the means of appointing officials. As the preceding analysis underscores,
an all-encompassing formula must be adopted if effective reforms are to be realized on

A New Model, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 295, 313-314 (2008); Abuya & Mukundi, supra note 47, at 192-96.
355 Justice Macdonald, the Chief Justice of Nova Scotia, describes team work as an essential trait for judges
to possess. See Macdonald, supra note 281, at 172-173.
356 See generally K.D. Ewing, A Theory of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative,
Accountable and Independent Judiciary, 38 ALBERTA L. REV. 708, 721 (2000).
357 ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act 1991) art. 76.
358 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 22.
359 See also Gregory Noone, The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War II, 47 NAVAL
L. REV. 176, 207 (2000) (“Laws are never perfect in either their creation”).
360 Independent Review Commission, supra note 12, at 9.
361 See also CHENJERAI HOVE, SHEBEEN TALES: MESSAGES FROM HARARE 116 (1994) (“Democracy can
never thrive in a political monologue in which the leaders, like rain gods, pour messages on the heads of
disempowered individuals and communities”).
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the ground. Additionally, if real results are to be achieved, members of the public must be
actively involved.362
¶93
Government institutions must take a more active role in the discharge of their
mandate. Collectively, they must work toward ensuring that any person suspected of
having engaged in any electoral malpractice is arrested, charged, and tried in accordance
with due process principals. Proper investigations must be taken to ensure that all
perpetrators are brought before the court. All those found guilty must be punished for the
offence they committed. These measures will send a strong signal that these institutions
are taking their roles seriously and will go a long way toward restoring the confidence in
the government that many citizens have lost.
¶94
Kenya and Zimbabwe are repackaging themselves as democratic states. This is a
step in the right direction. Through this process, both countries could bring about the
change they need and deserve. It is in the interest of both to grasp this opportunity with
both hands. If the current leaders fail to follow through, history will no doubt judge them
harshly.
VII. POSTSCRIPT
¶95

As of June 2010, there were constitutional developments in Kenya. Parliament had
passed a draft of a new constitution, which was awaiting a referendum in August 2010.
The new legal order seeks to introduce a number of fundamental changes. Firstly, it
makes provision for a new EMB. Clause 88 of the draft law, which establishes this
institution, excludes any person who has held office or stood for election as a member of
parliament or of a political party. Also excluded are state officials. The draft legislation
also expands the mandate of the EMB. Further, clause 166 of the draft Constitution,
unlike its current counterpart, involves parliament in the selection of judges. Restrictions
are also placed on the term for holding office of the chief judge. Additionally, the
procedures for removing a judge from office have been simplified. These legal changes
could go a long way toward reducing strengthening the rule of law and democracy in
Kenya.
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